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The Flag Can Travel but the Constitution 
Must Ask Permission: How the First 
Circuit and the District for Puerto Rico 
Commit to Equal Protection Without 
Abandoning the Insular Cases Doctrine 
Alejandro J. Anselmi González* 
For American citizens, one of the most important safe-
guards guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States 
is the equal protection of the law. The United States prides 
itself on the doctrine and jurisprudence of equal protection 
because of the social progression achieved since the end of 
the Civil War. The Reconstruction Amendments to the Con-
stitution eliminated the institution of slavery and were sup-
posed to guarantee equal civil and legal status to all citi-
zens. The Constitution, however, has not been consistently 
interpreted in this way since the end of the Spanish-
American War in 1898. The nation emerged from this con-
flict with a renewed colonial prerogative and with newly 
acquired territories overseas: Puerto Rico, Guam, and the 
Philippines. The acquisition of new territory, populated by 
peoples of wholly different cultures to those of the Anglo-
Saxon, European-American political elites of Washington, 
D.C., necessitated an approach to government that was po-
litically and legally rejected since the founding of the na-
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tion: colonialism. In Puerto Rico and later unincorporated 
territories—those not intended for eventual statehood—
colonial governance meant political and social subjuga-
tion. The Supreme Court legitimized the federal govern-
ment’s colonial plans in a series of decisions beginning in 
the late 19th century, known as the Insular Cases. These 
decisions influence the legal status of American citizens re-
siding in the unincorporated territories and allow the fed-
eral government to evade the constitutional mandate of 
equal protection of the law. This Note discusses the racist 
logic of the Insular Cases and the vestiges of colonial ap-
propriation of the unincorporated territories, reflected in 
the exclusion of Puerto Ricans from the Supplemental Se-
curity Income program. In United States v. Vaello-Madero, 
the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico and the 
First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the federal govern-
ment’s exclusion of Puerto Ricans from that program, ar-
guing that equal protection of the law, embodied in the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, does not allow the 
federal government to abuse its constitutional power under 
the Territory Clause to regulate the unincorporated territo-
ries. This Note concludes, however, that Vaello-Madero is 
not a vehement rejection of the Insular Cases and their ju-
risprudential progeny and that it remains unlikely for the 
Supreme Court to undo its labor from the late 19th and 
early 20th century, when its opinions treating the subject of 
the territories were heavily marked by notions of Social 
Darwinism and racism. Nonetheless, Vaello-Madero is a 
promising hint that the federal judiciary is sensitive to the 
inconsistent application of the guarantee of equal protec-
tion throughout the U.S. territories overseas and is willing 
to resist the Insular Cases doctrine. 
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It happened a long time ago an’ I don’t raymimber 
clearly how it came up, but some fellow said that 
ivrywhere th’ constitution wint, th’ flag was sure to 
go. ‘I don’t believe wan wurrud iv it,’ said th’ other 
fellow. ‘Ye can’t make me think th’ Constitution is 
goin’ thrapezin’ around ivrywhere a young liftnant 
in th’ ar–rmy takes it into his head to stick a flag 
pole. It’s too old. It’s a homestayin’ Constitution 
with a blue coat with brass buttons onto it, an’ it 
walks with a goold–headed cane. It’s old an’ it’s 
feeble an’ it prefers to set on th’ front stoop an’ 
amuse th’ childher. It wudden’t last a minyit in thim 
thropical climes. ‘T wud get a pain in th’ fourteenth 
amindmint an’ die before th’ doctors cud get ar–
round to cut it out . . . ‘ ‘But,’ says th’ other, ‘if it 
wants to thravel, why not lave it?’ ‘But it don’t 
want to.’ ‘I says it does.’ ‘How’ll we find out?’ 
‘We’ll ask th’ Supreme Court. They’ll now what’s 
good f’r it.’ 
– Finley Peter Dunne, Mr. Dooley’s Opinions 
(1901)1 
                                                                                                             
1FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY’S OPINIONS 21–22 (R.H. Russell 1901). 
Speaking in a thick Irish brogue, Mr. Dooley commented on the popular ques-
tion of whether the “Constitution follows the flag” as the United States expand-
ed into new territories beyond the continental shores. This observation was made 
in a discussion surrounding the nature of the Insular Cases. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Puerto Rico faces unprecedented challenges. The Island, which 
is a United States territory,2 has experienced a sharp decline in 
government revenues.3 Commencing in 1996, the Federal Gov-
ernment “scaled back” a series of tax credit incentives for Ameri-
can corporations doing business in Puerto Rico.4 The progressive 
cancellation of tax credit incentives culminated in 2006, after 
which the Puerto Rican government “increasingly turned to the 
debt markets” to obtain funding for government spending.5 Ac-
cording to the United States Government Accountability Office, 
between the fiscal years 2005 and 2014, Puerto Rico’s public debt 
grew from $39.2 billion to $67.8 billion, representing 66% of its 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP).6 In January 2016, Puerto Rico 
defaulted on its public debt.7 By then, Puerto Rico’s fiscal crater 
had grown to $72 billion.8 That same year, Congress passed the 
Puerto Rico Oversight, Management and Economic Stability Act 
(PROMESA) to address Puerto Rico’s default and fiscal responsi-
bilities.9 
                                                                                                             
 2 Tim Webber, What Does Being A U.S. Territory Mean For Puerto Rico?, 
NPR (Oct. 13, 2017, 4:39 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/10/13/557500279/
what-does-being-a-u-s-territory-mean-for-puerto-rico. 
 3 Javier Balmaceda, Long in Recession, Puerto Rico Needs More Than Just 
COVID-19 Relief to Overcome Its Crises, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 
1 (May 7, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/5-7-20econ
.pdf. 
 4 Diane Lourdes Dick, U.S. Tax Imperialism in Puerto Rico, 65 AM. U.L. 
REV. 1, 7 (2015). 
 5 Id. 
 6 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-160, U.S. TERRITORIES 
PUBLIC DEBT OUTLOOK 12 (2017). 
 7 Mary Williams Walsh, Struggling Puerto Rico Defaults on Its Debt Pay-
ments, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/05/bus
iness/dealbook/puerto-rico-defaults-on-debt-payments.html. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Patricia Guadalupe, Here’s How PROMESA Aims to Tackle Puerto Ri-
co’s Debt, NBC NEWS (June 30, 2016, 1:39 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com
/news/latino/here-s-how-promesa-aims-tackle-puerto-rico-s-debt-n601741 (“It 
creates a fiscal control board comprised of seven members. The board would not 
be accountable to the island government and would have control over Puerto 
Rico’s budget, laws, financial plans, and regulations. The control board has the 
power to force the island government to balance its budget and force a restruc-
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As of 2019, the percentage of Puerto Rico residents who live in 
poverty is approximately 43%.10 According to the U.S. Census 
Bureau, “poverty in Puerto Rico is still much higher than the U.S. 
national rate of 13.1% and is more than double the poverty rate of 
19.7% in Mississippi,” the state with the “highest poverty rates in 
2018.”11 Additionally, Puerto Rico’s population is becoming older 
due to a combination of declining birth rates and emigration of 
young residents.12 
At the same time, Puerto Rico exhibits a higher rate of adults 
with some type of disability than the United States.13 Adult Puerto 
Rican residents show higher levels of “select functional disability 
types,” showing higher rates of mobility, cognition, independent 
living, hearing, vision, and self–care limitations than adults in the 
United States.14 As of late 2020, Puerto Ricans on the Island, who 
are U.S. citizens,15 did not receive the same federally–funded disa-
bility benefits as citizens in the States.16 In fact, the Puerto Rican 
government resorted to the municipal bond market to fund its Med-
icaid budget.17 In 2016, debt accrued to provide for disabled resi-
dents’ healthcare “constitute[d] an estimated one–third of Puerto 
Rico’s massive $70 billion of outstanding bonds.”18 Instead of re-
ceiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, Puerto Ri-
                                                                                                             
turing with bondholders . . . and other creditors if an agreement is not 
reached.”). 
 10 QuickFacts: Puerto Rico, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov
/quickfacts/PR (last visited Nov. 7, 2021). 
 11 Brian Glassman, A Third of Movers from Puerto Rico to the Mainland 
United States Relocated to Florida in 2018, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 26, 
2019), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2019/09/puerto-rico-outmigration-
increases-poverty-declines.html. 
 12 Puerto Rico’s Nutrition Assistance Program Helps Seniors, CTR. ON 
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 1, 2 (2020), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default
/files/atoms/files/6-11-20fa3.pdf. 
 13 Disability Impacts Puerto Rico, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/disabilityandhealth/impacts/puerto-
rico.html (last updated Jun. 28, 2021). 
 14 Id. 
 15 Jones–Shafroth Act, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951, 953 (1917). 
 16 Robin Respaut, The disabled in Puerto Rico fend for themselves after 
decades of U.S. neglect, REUTERS (Dec. 9, 2016, 12:00 PM), https://www.
reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-puertorico-disability/. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
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cans received a “meager and nearly forgotten federal program from 
the 1960s, called Aid to the Aged, Blind, or Disabled” (AABD).19 
Ordinarily, elderly, blind, and disabled United States citizens “liv-
ing in any of the 50 states, Washington, D.C., and the Mariana Is-
lands,” who “struggle financially” receive SSI benefits.20 Howev-
er, Puerto Rican residents are not eligible to receive SSI benefits.21 
The available assistance for disabled Puerto Rican residents is 
inadequate, especially when compared to the benefits that other 
disabled citizens receive in the continental United States and the 
Mariana Islands.22 For instance, under AABD, Puerto Rican resi-
dents must earn $65 or less per month to be financially eligible for 
the program.23 Meanwhile, individuals eligible for SSI benefits 
must earn $750 or less to satisfy financial requirements.24 Fur-
thermore, Puerto Rican residents who qualify for AABD receive, 
on average, $77 per month in assistance while SSI beneficiaries 
receive an average of $533.25 
There is a territorial disparity between Puerto Rico, whose res-
idents are not eligible to receive SSI benefits, and the States (and 
the Northern Mariana Islands), whose residents are eligible for 
SSI.26 It is difficult to explain this discrepancy in treatment without 
understanding Puerto Rico’s complicated territorial status.27 Puerto 
Rico is neither independent, nor a state of the United States; rather, 
                                                                                                             
 19 Id. 
 20 Danica Coto, US court upholds SSI for Puerto Ricans in key ruling, ABC 
NEWS (Apr. 10, 2020, 7:05 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireSto
ry/us-court-upholds-ssi-puerto-ricans-key-ruling-70095490. 
 21 Id. 
 22 See id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 WILLIAM R. MORTON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10482, SUPPLEMENTAL 
SECURITY INCOME (SSI) 3 (2020). 
 27 See Samuel Issacharoff et al., What Is Puerto Rico?, 94 IND. L.J. 1, 2 
(2019) (“The events of the day, from hurricane relief to debt restructuring, 
brought to public attention uncertainty about what it means to be a “Common-
wealth,” a legal status unmentioned in the U.S. Constitution, a word that lacks a 
direct translation into Spanish, and indeed a concept without a terribly clear 
meaning in English.”). 
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it is a commonwealth, the meaning of which is hotly debated.28 
Puerto Rico’s unprecedented status is due to 20th century legisla-
tion legitimized by the Supreme Court in the infamous Insular 
Cases.29 The Foraker Act, the Jones–Shafroth Act, Public Law 
600, and Public Law 447 crafted a colonial regime30 whereby the 
Puerto Rican government lacks true sovereignty.31 Furthermore, 
the Insular Cases sanctioned the federal government’s colonial 
project and recognized Puerto Rico as a foreign territory “in a do-
mestic sense,” legalizing unequal treatment of the laws in the terri-
tories.32 However, the fact remains that Puerto Ricans are United 
States citizens.33 
Recognizing this, the District Court for the District of Puerto 
Rico and the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that it was uncon-
stitutional to exclude Puerto Rican residents from SSI benefits be-
cause equal protection of the law and due process guarantees of the 
Constitution apply equally in the States and in unincorporated ter-
ritories.34 As a result, United States v. Vaello-Madero elevates 
Puerto Rico’s status, and that of other United States unincorporated 
territories, vis–à–vis the states and incorporated territories, and 
signals a shift towards limiting the federal government’s capacity 
to “abuse the territories” by denying them equal rights.35 Neverthe-
                                                                                                             
 28 R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44721, POLITICAL STATUS OF 
PUERTO RICO: BRIEF BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS FOR 
CONGRESS 5–6 (2017). 
 29 Juan R. Torruella, Ruling America’s Colonies: The Insular Cases, 32 
YALE L. REV. 57, 58 (2013) (“These cases authorized the colonial regime creat-
ed by Congress, which allowed the United States to continue its administra-
tion—and exploitation—of the territories acquired from Spain after the Spanish–
American War of 1898”). 
 30 Cf. id. (referring to the colonial relationship created by legislation after 
1898, including the Foraker legislation, Jones–Shafroth legislation, Public Law 
600, and Public Law 447). 
 31 Efrén Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism: 
The Insular Cases (1901–1922), 65 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 225, 235 (1996). 
 32 See id. at 249–50 (explaining Justice White’s incorporation doctrine, 
which later became a central component of the Insular Cases doctrine). 
 33 Jones–Shafroth Act, ch. 145, 39. Stat. 951, 953 (1917). 
 34 United States v. Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d 208, 215 (D.P.R. 2019); 
United States v. Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d 12, 31 (1st Cir. 2020). 
 35 See Mark Joseph Stern, Judge Blocks Discrimination Against Puerto 
Ricans, Says Federal Government Is Engaging in “Citizenship Apartheid,” 
2021] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 95 
 
less, the federal government has already petitioned for a writ of 
certiorari to appeal the First Circuit’s decision in the Supreme 
Court.36 There is much uncertainty, however, surrounding how the 
Supreme Court would handle an appeal of Vaello-Madero, espe-
cially because a conservative–appointed majority could “rush to 
strike down or hollow out long–standing liberal precedents,”37 like 
United States v. Windsor,38 where Justice Kennedy reiterated a 
longstanding principle of equal protection analysis: “The Constitu-
tion’s guarantee of equality ‘must at the very least mean that a bare 
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot’ 
justify disparate treatment of that group.”39 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has avoided addressing the ju-
risprudential quagmire that the Insular Cases present, even when 
directly asked to do so, making it unlikely that the Court will ex-
plicitly reverse any portion of the Insular Cases doctrine.40 Further 
decreasing the likelihood that the Justices will offer any direct pro-
nouncements against the Insular Cases, Vaello-Madero does not 
rely directly on a rejection of the Insular Cases doctrine to strike 
down the government’s effort to treat residents of Puerto Rico dif-
ferently from residents of the States and the Northern Mariana Is-
lands.41 Consequently, even if the Supreme Court agrees with the 
First Circuit, it is unlikely that it will undo the principles from the 
Insular Cases.42 
                                                                                                             
SLATE (Feb. 5, 2019, 5:36 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/02/
puerto-rico-social-security-benefits-gelpi-ruling-citizenship-apartheid.html. 
 36 Brief for Petitioner–Appellant at 1, United States v. Vaello-Madero, No. 
20–303 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 4, 2020) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. 
 37 Amelia Thomson–DeVeaux & Laura Bronner, How A Conservative 6–3 
Majority Would Reshape The Supreme Court, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 28, 
2020, 6:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-a-conservative-6-3-
majority-would-reshape-the-supreme-court/. 
 38 Stern, supra note 35. 
 39 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770 (2013) (citing Dep’t of 
Agric. v. Moreno 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973)). 
 40 See Adriel I. Cepeda Derieux & Neil C. Weare, After Aurelius: What 
Future of the Insular Cases?, 130 YALE L.J. F. 284, 285 (2020). 
 41 Id. at 305. 
 42 See id. at 286 (“The Court declined to extend the Insular Cases and 
seemed to question ‘their continued validity,’ but it still dismissed the request to 
‘overrule the much–criticized’ decisions ‘and their progeny.’”). See also Lyle 
Denniston, Constitution Check: Are the Insular Cases Still Binding, After a Cen-
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Vaello-Madero stands for the proposition that fundamental 
constitutional protections apply in the unincorporated territories, 
like Puerto Rico, even where there is no explicit congressional 
proclamation extending the same to these lands.43 Vaello-Madero 
implicitly represents the judiciary’s stance against the incorpora-
tion doctrine derived from Justice White’s concurring opinion in 
Downes v. Bidwell,44 which developed to threaten even the most 
fundamental guarantees in the Constitution when applied in unin-
corporated territories.45 While Vaello-Madero does not signal the 
end of the Insular Cases doctrine,46 it does represent a more re-
strictive reading of the powers granted to Congress by the Territo-
rial Clause and a limitation of overtly racist 20th century jurispru-
dence regarding the governance of the unincorporated territories.47 
                                                                                                             
tury?, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (Jun. 17, 2016), https://constitutioncenter.org
/blog/constitution-check-are-the-insular-cases-still-binding-after-a-century (The 
Supreme Court has relied upon legal principles derived from the Insular Cases 
despite the impetus of modern civil rights advocacy to “advance the constitu-
tional protection for people in the territories” by urging the Court to abandon 
such outdated jurisprudence.). 
 43 United States v. Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d 208, 213 (D.P.R. 2019). 
 44 Rivera Ramos, supra note 31, at 247–48. 
 45 See Marybeth Herald, Does the Constitution Follow the Flag Into United 
States Territories or Can It Be Separately Purchased and Sold, 22 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 707, 712 (1995). 
 46 See Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 212 (stating that the opinion will 
not address the complicated constitutional questions surrounding Puerto Rico’s 
political status). 
 47 See id. at 210–11; see also United States v. Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d 12, 
17–18 (1st Cir. 2020); see also Rivera Ramos, supra note 31, at 289 (“The dis-
course of the Insular Cases incorporated many of the notions that constituted 
what I have termed the ‘ideology of expansion.’ First of all, it was overtly racist. 
In Downes, Justice Brown expressed: 
It is obvious that in the annexation of outlying and distant possessions grave 
questions will arise from differences of race, habits, laws and customs of the 
people, and from differences of soil, climate and production, which may require 
action on the part of Congress that would be quite unnecessary in the annexation 
of contiguous territory inhabited only by people of the same race, or by scattered 
bodies of native Indians. 
The obvious racism of the Court’s expressions cannot be separated from others 
reflecting an adherence by some members of the Court to the tenets of the ideo-
logies of Manifest Destiny and Social Darwinism, which were part of the ideo-
logical framework of the dominant circles in the United States at the time.”). 
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This Note will analyze the issue of Puerto Rico’s constitutional 
status and the role of the Insular Cases through an examination of 
the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico’s decision in 
United States v. Vaello-Madero and the First Circuit’s affirmation. 
To aid comprehension of the legality of the federal government’s 
treatment of American citizens in Puerto Rico, Part II will outline 
the relationship that exists between the United States and Puerto 
Rico, with a particular emphasis on legislation appropriating—not 
incorporating—the Island into the U.S. constitutional framework. 
Understanding the distinction between appropriation and incorpo-
ration is key to accurately perceive the degree to which constitu-
tional protections attach to citizens residing in the territories. 
Part III will examine how American jurists approached the 
question of governance of the territories at the beginning of the 
20th century to provide an ideological background to the Insular 
Cases. This analysis will provide the reader with a summary of the 
salient issues that preeminent legal minds and decision–makers 
faced in the aftermath of the Spanish–American War, compelling 
the creation of a framework to organize the relationship between 
mainland states and the acquired islands. The conclusions drawn at 
this point in history directly influenced foundational Supreme 
Court decisions, known as the Insular Cases, cementing the juris-
prudential thinking of the early 20th century regarding the rights of 
Anglo–Saxon majorities in relation to the new Hispanic, Pacific–
Islander, and Asian subjects. Part III will then analyze the rele-
vance of the Insular Cases, explaining how constitutional guaran-
tees apply to residents of unincorporated territories. Particular at-
tention will be dedicated to the development and influence of the 
territorial doctrine and how it has evolved to deprive U.S. subjects 
of fundamental constitutional guarantees. 
Part IV will present the Vaello-Madero decisions and Part V 
will analyze them in light of precedent and legislation establishing 
Puerto Rico’s status. This analysis will show how Vaello-Madero 
militates against the overexpansion of the Insular Cases doctrine 
by reaffirming that fundamental guarantees, like equal protection 
of the law and due process, do apply in unincorporated territories. 
However, it will also show that Vaello-Madero is not altogether 
revolutionary, as it does not advocate for an outright rejection of 
the Insular Cases, and merely promotes a return to the majority’s 
98 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1 
 
pronouncement in Downes v. Bidwell, which postulated that “cer-
tain natural rights” found in the Constitution must extend to all 
regions under the American flag.48 Lastly, Part VI will address 
future possibilities regarding the validity of the Insular Cases and 
the impact of Vaello-Madero on the meaning of citizenship and 
equal protection under the laws. 
Comprehending how Vaello-Madero contravenes 120–year–
old jurisprudence that created a modern colonial system49 whereby 
territorial citizens, like Puerto Ricans today, were relegated to sec-
ond–class status50 will highlight the implicit understanding among 
governing circles in Washington that U.S. citizens in the territories 
are not American citizens.51 Vaello-Madero is certainly a step in 
the correct direction to secure the rights of all United States citi-
zens, but it is insufficient to supersede a century’s worth of juris-
prudential development at the Supreme Court.52 Modern civil 
rights advocacy for the territories is pushing the call to reject the 
Insular Cases to the highest court of the land; it is now up to the 
Supreme Court to decide. 
                                                                                                             
 48 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 282–83 (1901) (discussing the differ-
ence between natural rights, like personal liberty, equal protection of the laws 
and due process, and those rights peculiar to the jurisprudential system of the 
United States, like citizenship, suffrage, others “unnecessary to the proper pro-
tection of individuals.”). 
 49 See generally Rivera Ramos, supra note 31 (discussing how the Insular 
Cases created a colonial relationship between the United States and the diverse 
territories acquired after the Spanish–American War). 
 50 Pedro A. Malavet, The Inconvenience of a “Constitution [that] Follows 
the Flag . . . but Doesn’t Quite Catch Up with It”: From Downes v. Bidwell to 
Boumediene v. Bush, 80 MISS. L.J. 181, 249 (2010). 
 51 See id. at 249–50 (“[T]he Court’s interpretation [in Balzac v. Porto Rico, 
258 U.S. 298 (1922),] of the [grant of citizenship to Puerto Ricans] clearly as-
sumes that Puerto Rican U.S. citizens are not the ‘American citizens’ who could 
resettle an ‘American’ state.”) (emphasis added). In turn, these implicit under-
standings of colonial citizens led to a natural conclusion that they were not as 
deserving of constitutional guarantees as those on the mainland. See id. 
 52 Cf. id. at 256–57 (discussing a case similar in nature to Vaello-Madero 
but underscoring that “the matter remains in the hands of the Supreme 
Court . . . .”). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Puerto Rico’s Territorial and Political Status 
The United States acquired Puerto Rico from Spain in the af-
termath of the Spanish–American War.53 In the two decades after 
the conclusion of the war in 1898, it would have been difficult to 
describe Puerto Rico as anything other than a colony of the United 
States, which was considered “an international badge of dishonor 
for America.”54 While U.S. presidents focused on “lectur[ing] oth-
er countries about the instabilities of imperial control and the need 
for self–determination,”55 Puerto Rico was governed by presiden-
tially–appointed generals between 1898 and 1900.56 Accordingly, 
the “military governor in charge of the Army of Occupation” in 
Puerto Rico was the “administrator of civil affairs” and had the 
authority to “issue orders with the force of law.”57 Thus, the Unit-
ed States military “controlled” Puerto Rico’s “municipal laws and 
courts.”58 As one scholar commented: 
For two years, between the time that [the Treaty of 
Paris] was signed in 1898 and the enactment of the 
Foraker Act in 1900, Puerto Rico became a part of 
the nation. Yet, while Puerto Rico became an inte-
gral part of the U.S., the treaty, unlike prior treaties 
of this nature, did not provide for the annexation of 
the island or the naturalization of its inhabitants. In 
fact, the open–ended nature of this treaty enabled 
law and policy makers to invent a new legal status 
of space that could be located somewhere in be-
tween a territory and a possession.59 
                                                                                                             
 53 David Rezvani, The Basis of Puerto Rico’s Constitutional Status: Colony, 
Compact, or “Federacy”?, 122 POL. SCI. Q. 115, 115 (2007). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Military Government in Puerto Rico, LIBR. OF CONG. (Jun. 22, 2011), 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/milgovt.html. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Charles R. Venator Santiago, Constitutional interpretation and nation 
building: the Territorial Clause and the Foraker Act, 1787–1900 132 (Sept. 
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In fact, for the inhabitants of the claimed territories, the most 
crucial aspect of the peace treaty between the United States and 
Spain was Article IX, by which Spain surrendered its sovereignty 
over Guam, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico.60 Under Article IX, 
Congress would decide the political status “of the native inhabit-
ants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States.”61 
i. The Foraker Act of 1900: Establishing a Civilian 
Government in Puerto Rico without Sovereignty or 
Constitutional Guarantees 
On April 12, 1900, Congress enacted the Foraker Act, official-
ly known as the Organic Act of 1900, which “recogni[zed] Puerto 
Rico as a dependent possession of the United States”62 and estab-
lished a civilian government on the Island.63 Nonetheless, the Fo-
raker Act has been described as a means by which Congress 
achieved colonialism through legislation.64 According to Professor 
Martin J. Collo, the underlying motivations for the Foraker Act 
were not merely to provide a transition to civilian government, but 
also to secure an important strategic base in the Atlantic, pursue an 
“aggressive inter–American trade policy,” and commit to bringing 
the “blessings of civilization” to the Island.65 Ohio Senator Joseph 
P. Foraker, sponsor for the legislation, argued: “[T]he sooner this 
country realizes that it is a power among the nations of the world 
and wants colonial possessions, the better.”66 Accordingly, a civil-
ian government in Puerto Rico was not the central focus of the Fo-
raker Act; rather, the goal was to delineate “the role of the United 
                                                                                                             
2002) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst) (on file with 
author) (emphasis added). 
 60 See id. at 136–38. 
 61 A Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain: December 10, 
1898, AVALON PROJECT, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/sp1898.asp 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2021). 
 62 Santiago, supra note 59, at 127. 
 63 See Foraker Act, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77, 81–86 (1900). 
 64 Martin J. Collo, The Legislative History of Colonialism: Puerto Rico and 
the United States Congress, 1898 to 1950, 12 J. OF THIRD WORLD STUD. 265, 
268 (1995). 
 65 Id. at 269. 
 66 Id. at 268. 
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States as a world power.”67 It should be no surprise that the Fo-
raker Act only provided for a civilian government with limited 
power, as Senator Foraker believed it was important to grant Puer-
to Ricans “some measure of self–rule,” but “only as much as ‘it 
was safe to give them.’”68 Thus, only the lower chamber of the 
Island’s legislature, the House of Delegates, was to be elected by 
qualified voters.69 
While the Foraker Act established a civil government, it made 
no movement toward granting the Island’s residents United States 
citizenship.70 Instead, the law states that they ceased to be Spanish 
subjects but were now “deemed and held to be citizens of Porto 
Rico, and as such entitled to the protection of the United 
States . . . .”71 Furthermore, the Island’s governor and its executive 
council were to be appointed by the President of the United 
States.72 Crucially, the Act subjected Puerto Rico to all laws of the 
United States73 and preserved Congress’s supremacy over the Is-
land’s legislative assembly by providing “[t]hat all laws enacted by 
the legislative assembly shall be reported to the Congress of the 
United States, which hereby reserves the power and authority, if 
deemed advisable, to annul the same.”74 Additionally, the Foraker 
legislation provided that qualified voters in Puerto Rico would 
elect a “Resident commissioner to [the] United States.”75 The Res-
ident Commissioner would “be entitled to official recognition as 
such by all Departments, upon presentation to the Department of 
State of a certificate of election of the governor of Porto Ri-
co . . . .”76 but would have no voting power in Congress.77 
                                                                                                             
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 270. 
 69 Foraker Act, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77, 83 (1900). 
 70 See generally id. (making no mention of providing residents of Puerto 
Rico, previously Spanish subjects, with United States citizenship). 
 71 Id. at 79. 
 72 Id. at 81–82. 
 73 Id. at 80. 
 74 Id. at 83. 
 75 Foraker Act, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77, 86 (1900). 
 76 Id. 
 77 Lanny Thompson, The Imperial Republic: A Comparison of the Insular 
Territories under U.S. Dominion After 1898, 71 PAC. HIST. REV. 535, 559 
(2002). 
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The Foraker legislation granted Puerto Rico fewer autonomist 
powers than what Spain had given to proponents of self–
determination rights for the Island in 1897.78 In the months leading 
up to the Spanish–American War, Spain attempted to assuage in-
dependentist fever in Cuba and Puerto Rico by granting them the 
right to self–government with the Autonomy Charters of 1897.79 
Puerto Rico’s Autonomy Charter granted “a robust form of auton-
omy, with a local legislature and representation in the [Spanish] 
Cortes.”80 In that same year, Spain also granted residents of Cuba 
and Puerto Rico the same rights of Spanish citizens and universal 
voting rights to all men over twenty–five.81 
Meanwhile, the Foraker Act subjected all decisions by the Is-
land’s legislative assembly to Congressional approval.82 Addition-
ally, the right to vote was circumscribed by qualifications imposed 
“under the laws and military orders in force . . . subject to such 
modifications and additional qualifications and such regulations 
and restrictions as to registration as may be prescribed by the ex-
ecutive council.”83 The Island’s sole elected representative in Con-
gress “had no clearly defined rights or duties” and his status was 
“practically the same as that of a territorial delegate” or “a nonvot-
ing, second–class member of the House of Representatives.”84 The 
Foraker legislation also deprived Puerto Ricans of control over the 
Island’s political economy because they had no power to decide 
                                                                                                             
 78 See Collo, supra note 64, at 271 (“The reaction of the Puerto Rican polit-
ical elite to the provisions of the Foraker Act ranged from disappointment to 
bitter resentment. In view of early U.S. promises of ‘liberal institutions’ and 
‘freedoms,’ most Puerto Ricans felt defrauded. Not only did Congress grant the 
island considerably fewer powers of self–governance than were acquired under 
Spanish rule, but the provisions of the Foraker Act clearly showed that Congress 
did not intend to prepare the island for eventual statehood.”). 
 79 See Marisabel Brás, The Changing of the Guard: Puerto Rico in 1898, 
LIBR. OF CONG. (Jun. 22, 2011), https://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/bras.html. 
 80 Christina Duffy Ponsa, When Statehood Was Autonomy, in 
RECONSIDERING THE INSULAR CASES: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN 
EMPIRE 1, 24 (Gerald L. Neuman & Tomiko Brown–Nagin eds., 2015). 
 81 Autonomy and War, LIBR. OF CONG., https://www.loc.gov/collections
/puerto-rico-books-and-pamphlets/articles-and-essays/nineteenth-century-
puerto-rico/autonomy-and-the-war/. 
 82 Foraker Act, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77, 83 (1900). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Thompson, supra note 77, at 559. 
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trade policies or employ tariffs.85 Consequently, the Foraker Act 
reversed the majority of the freedoms found in the Autonomy 
Charter of 1897 and implemented a “system of strict, condescend-
ing colonial tutelage” that made Puerto Ricans “dependent wards 
of the U.S. Congress, without the full guarantees of the U.S. Con-
stitution.”86 
ii. The Jones–Shafroth Act of 1917: Granting United States 
Citizenship to Puerto Ricans without Incorporating Puerto Rico 
into the Union 
Puerto Rico’s second organic law, the Jones–Shafroth Act of 
1917, extended a new measure of autonomy and granted United 
States citizenship to all Puerto Ricans.87 The Jones–Shafroth legis-
lation extended multiple guarantees, including: due process, equal 
protection, the right to counsel, habeas corpus, warrant require-
ments, search and seizure protections, freedom of speech, religious 
liberty, and prohibitions of ex post facto laws and bills of attainder, 
among others.88 Additionally, the law replaced the executive coun-
cil with an elected senate as the upper chamber of the legislative 
department of the Island.89 Most importantly, the law provided 
“[t]hat all citizens of Porto Rico . . . and all natives of Porto Ri-
co . . . are hereby declared, and shall be deemed and held to be, 
citizens of the United States.”90 The Jones–Shafroth Act was a de-
finitive step toward cementing the permanence of the “existing 
relationship” with Puerto Rico, which the Americans believed 
                                                                                                             
 85 Collo, supra note 64, at 272. 
 86 Id. at 271; see also José A. Cabranes, Citizenship and the American Em-
pire: Notes on the Legislative History of the United States Citizenship of Puerto 
Ricans, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 391, 396–97 n.12 (1978) (“The status of national, as 
distinguished from citizen, became a convenient construct for those who favored 
territorial expansion but did not wish to make the people of the new territory 
citizens of the United States or otherwise suggest that they might aspire to 
equality under the American constitutional system.”). 
 87 Collo, supra note 64, at 275. 
 88 See generally Jones–Shafroth Act, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951 (1917). 
 89 Id. at 959 (“Except as herein otherwise provided, the Senate of Porto Rico 
shall exercise all of the purely legislative powers and functions heretofore exer-
cised by the Executive Council . . . .”). 
 90 Id. at 953. 
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more tractable and “loyal” than the other 1898 acquisitions.91 At 
the same time, the idea that the relationship with Puerto Rico 
should be perpetuated was reinforced by the “apparent acceptance 
of colonial rule” in Puerto Rico, given that “expressions of unhap-
piness with American colonial rule” were “sporadic and modest” 
and focused on the “limited scope of local self–government,” par-
ticularly under the Foraker Act.92 As such, the granting of citizen-
ship was designed as “a means of acknowledging the special place 
of Puerto Rico among the new colonial territories and of express-
ing the virtually universal expectation of a permanent relation-
ship.”93 
The grant of citizenship meant that the federal government did 
not consider independence to be in Puerto Rico’s future, and, ac-
cording to Judge José A. Cabranes,94 created “a second–class citi-
zenship for a community of persons that was given no expectation 
of equality under the American system,” which in turn “perpetu-
at[ed] the colonial status of Puerto Rico.”95 In effect, the Jones–
Shafroth Act: 
[W]as intended to satisfy Puerto Rican desires for 
“dignity,” while establishing a permanent link be-
tween the now strategically important island and the 
United States. But Puerto Ricans did not receive the 
same type of citizenship enjoyed by U.S. citizens 
living on the mainland. Instead, they were awarded 
a second–class, passive citizenship. The new U.S. 
citizens in Puerto Rico still remained outside the 
purview of the protections, rights and liberties of 
the U.S. constitution. In fact, the U.S. Congress re-
tained the power to determine which rights would 
                                                                                                             
 91 Cabranes, supra note 86, at 461 (“The demand for American citizenship 
on the part of Porto Ricans is genuine and well–nigh universal. It has become a 
deep popular sentiment, and my experience in the island convinced me that a 
continued refusal to grant it will gravely wound the sensibilities of this loyal 
people. It is a practical as well as a sentimental matter. A Porto Rican traveling 
abroad is literally a man without a country.”). 
 92 Id. at 443. 
 93 Id at 444. 
 94 Judge of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals since 1994. 
 95 Cabranes, supra note 86, at 398. 
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be enjoyed by these second–class citizens. Moreo-
ver, Puerto Ricans were not granted the right to vote 
in U.S. presidential elections, nor were they award-
ed voting representation in the U.S. Congress.96 
For the first time in American history, prospects of statehood 
or “the full panoply of rights guaranteed by the United States Con-
stitution” did not accompany the granting of citizenship97 but it did 
signal that Puerto Rico belonged to the United States, and, in turn, 
“affirmed [the United States’] acceptance of the contemporaneous 
European concept of the ownership of peoples.”98 
iii. Public Law 600 and Public Law 447: Creating the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico without Altering the Colonial 
Relationship 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, “continued colonial 
prerogatives” became an “international liability” for the United 
States as a result of the global anticolonialism movement.99 On 
July 3, 1950, Congress approved Public Law 600, whereby the 
United States “fully recogniz[ed] the principle of government by 
consent . . . so that the people of Puerto Rico may organize a gov-
ernment pursuant to a constitution of their own adoption.”100 Con-
gress prescribed the mechanism by which Puerto Ricans were to 
elect local representatives and draft a constitution of their own.101 
The mechanisms of Public Law 600 culminated on July 3, 1952, 
with Public Law 447 which recognized and approved the “consti-
tution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.”102 In an address to 
the legislative assembly of Puerto Rico in 1955, Vice President 
Nixon offered the following about the new form of government: 
To me, it seems that Puerto Rico’s Commonwealth 
status is something new in constitutional govern-
ments. Something new in this sense: that at one and 
                                                                                                             
 96 Collo, supra note 64, at 276–77. 
 97 Cabranes, supra note 86, at 490. 
 98 Id. at 487. 
 99 Issacharoff et al., supra note 27, at 10. 
 100 Public Law 600, ch. 446, 64 Stat. 319, 319 (1950). 
 101 Id.; see also Issacharoff et al., supra note 27, at 10. 
 102 Public Law 447, ch. 567, 66 Stat. 327, 327 (1952). 
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in the same time, Puerto Rico is free; and in spite of 
the fact, Puerto Rico is associated; a free and asso-
ciated state. Free because you are, and associated 
because you want to be.103 
However, Puerto Rico was not on track to obtaining parity with 
the states in the Union.104 Notwithstanding the progressive recog-
nition of Puerto Rico’s right to self–governance, “it was clear that 
what was being created was not a state at all, but something that 
was without precedent in the history of American jurispru-
dence.”105 This is made especially visible by Judge Juan R. Torru-
ella,106 when he remarked that Justice White in Downes v. Bidwell 
“proclaimed that, while ‘not a foreign country,’ Puerto Rico ‘was 
foreign to the United States in a domestic sense.’ This conclusion 
establishes the untenable . . . concept of a territory that is both for-
eign and domestic at once.”107 
Furthermore, the purposes of Public Law 600 and Public Law 
447 track perfectly with the purposes of the Foraker and Jones–
Shafroth legislation: to perpetuate United States’ sovereignty over 
Puerto Rico.108 Even though Puerto Ricans were allowed to estab-
lish the Commonwealth with its own constitution, it did not mean 
that Puerto Rico was by any means a sovereign nation.109 Judge 
                                                                                                             
 103 R.B.S., Creative Statesmanship vs. the Territorial Clause: The Constitu-
tionality of Agreements Limiting Territorial Powers, 60 VA. L. REV. 1041, 1065 
(1974). 
 104 Id. at 1065–66 (“Statements in Congress reflecting an intent to make a 
binding commitment to local autonomy can be countered with statements assur-
ing hesitant congressmen hat the bill ‘would not change the status of the island 
of Puerto Rico relative to the United States . . . [or] alter the powers of sover-
eignty acquired by the people of the United States over Puerto Rico under the 
Treaty of Paris.’ Such contradictory statements render the legislative history of 
Public Law 600 highly ambiguous.”). 
 105 Rezvani, supra note 53, at 122. 
 106 Chief Judge of the First Circuit Court of Appeals between 1994 and 2001. 
 107 Torruella, supra note 29, at 71–72. 
 108 See id. at 80–81. 
 109 Id. at 80; see also Rafael Hernández Colón, The Evolution of Democratic 
Governance under the Territorial Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 50 SUFFOLK 
U.L. REV. 587, 597 (2017) (“‘Both the territorial and federal laws and the 
courts,’ the [Puerto Rico Supreme] Court stated, ‘whether exercising federal or 
local jurisdiction, are creations emanating from the same sovereignty.’ Relying 
on Shell, the P.R. Supreme Court concluded that Puerto Rico adopting its own 
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Torruella notes: “Although the constitutional status of Puerto Rico 
after this exercise was hotly debated, constitutionally speaking, no 
change was effectuated in its basic colonial relationship with the 
United States.”110 According to Judge Cabranes, “in permitting the 
establishment of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Congress ex-
pressly disavowed any intention to alter the island’s preexisting 
political relationship with the United States.”111 At the same time, 
the Puerto Rico Supreme Court recognizes this reality in Puerto 
Rico v. Sanchez Valle, where it stated that Puerto Rico did not 
cease to be a territory of the United States after enacting its consti-
tution because all of its authority derives from a Congressional 
grant of power, not from independent sovereignty.112 Given that 
Puerto Ricans were granted citizenship and permission to draft 
their own constitution by Congressional fiat, it is Congress, not the 
United States Constitution, who determines what rights are granted 
to the people of Puerto Rico and to what extent they are allowed to 
enjoy these.113 
B. The Territorial Clause: Congress’s Omnipotent Plenary 
Powers over the Territories and The Effects on Puerto Ricans 
Congress claims to have such plenipotentiary power granted to 
it by the Constitution via Article IV, Section 3’s “Territorial 
                                                                                                             
constitution by delegation from Congress did not confer sovereignty to Puerto 
Rico, even though it superseded most of the organic law that established the 
Puerto Rican territorial government. Despite the presence of its own constitu-
tion . . . the power of the Puerto Rican government . . . emanates from the U.S. 
government, not from its own sovereignty.”). 
 110 Torruella, supra note 29, at 80 (“As cogently summarized by one noted 
constitutional scholar: ‘Though the formal title has been changed, in constitu-
tional theory Puerto Rico remains a territory. This means that Congress contin-
ues to possess plenary but unexercised authority over Puerto Rico.’ In other 
words, while Law 600 vested the Puerto Rican people with a measure of direct 
governance . . . it left wholly unaltered Congress’s ‘supreme legislative [and 
administrative] power’ over Puerto Rico.”). 
 111 Cabranes, supra note 86, at 491. 
 112 See Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 579 U.S. ___ (2016). 
 113 See Torruella, supra note 29, at 73 (“Unfortunately for the inhabitants of 
the conquered Spanish islands, despite these well–reasoned dissents, the holding 
in Downes laid the grounds for recognition of omnipotent plenary powers in 
Congress . . . that to this day have allowed the United States to rule over the 
islands without their consent or their democratic participation.”). 
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Clause.”114 In combination with the provision of Article IX of the 
Treaty of Paris of 1898, Article IV’s Territorial Clause bestows 
upon Congress “Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules 
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belong-
ing to the United States . . . .”115 However, the precise meaning of 
the Territorial Clause and how it applies to United States territories 
has been questioned, and some argue that federal territorial powers 
can be used for more than “the autocratic creation of nineteenth–
century–type territories,” like “creative statesmanship” required to 
create “constitutionally protected spheres of sovereignty” in terri-
tories like Puerto Rico.116 Nonetheless, the federal courts must be 
the ones to re–shape the meaning of Congress’s territorial powers 
and provide for a more enlightened definition of territorial govern-
ance in Puerto Rico.117 
It is the newly invented legal status of Puerto Rico that oper-
ates to deprive its residents equal rights vis–à–vis American citi-
zens in the states.118 As Professor Linda Bosniak maintains, “citi-
zens and noncitizens are not beings found in nature; they are made 
and unmade by way of law and politics, and their making and un-
making can have momentous consequences.”119 Logically, then, 
the concept of citizenship is highly plastic,120 and in the United 
                                                                                                             
 114 Rivera Ramos, supra note 31, at 235. 
 115 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, cl. 2. 
 116 Hernández Colón, supra note 109, at 603–04 (“Citing Sanchez Valle, the 
court affirmed in United States v. Maldonado-Burgos that Law 600 and Law 
447, by design, provide Puerto Rico with the degree of autonomy and independ-
ence that inheres to states of the Union. The court also posited that Puerto Rico’s 
constitution created a different political status, which is exceptional in nature 
insofar as Congress relinquished its control over Puerto Rico’s internal af-
fairs.”). 
 117 Id. at 604 (discussing how the federal judiciary has recently promoted a 
more “democratic” understanding of the Territorial Clause, providing more pro-
tections for United States citizens in the territories). 
 118 See Malavet, supra note 50, at 189 (“For the territorial citizens this is not 
a temporary transition on the way to independence, rather it is a permanent sta-
tus of constitutional inferiority imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court and en-
forced by the executive and legislative branches now for over one hundred 
years.”). 
 119 Linda Bosniak, Persons and Citizens in Constitutional Thought, 8 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 9, 11 (2008). 
 120 Id. at 11. 
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States’ constitutional context, it is subject to interpretation by stat-
ute and the Supreme Court.121 In the case of Puerto Rico, Con-
gress, with the aid of the Supreme Court, has warped the means 
and reasons by which citizenship and incorporation are extend-
ed.122 In the aftermath of America’s colonial experiment of the 
early 20th century, United States citizenship means very little to the 
rights that Puerto Ricans hold in the American constitutional 
framework.123 
This is consequential because, in American constitutionalism, 
citizenship is the basis upon which individuals assert their claim to 
many rights and protections guaranteed by the laws and founda-
tional documents.124 Congress holds the reins of Puerto Rico’s sta-
tus, and with it, the rights of more than three million Puerto Ri-
cans.125 Without a strong claim to American citizenship, there are 
little guarantees “in the way of substantive social protection, rights, 
and responsibilities, and it entails virtually no democratic voice at 
all.”126 The federal government has recognized the precarious sta-
tus of Puerto Ricans to argue in favor of its ability to apply consti-
                                                                                                             
 121 Cf. Lisa María Pérez, Citizenship Denied: The “Insular Cases” and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 94 VA. L. REV. 1029, 1067 (2008) (highlighting the 
roles of the Supreme Court and Congress when interpreting the Constitution to 
determine the protections afforded to citizens and conferring citizenship to indi-
viduals, respectively). 
 122 See, e.g., id. at 1039 (“[I]t is within the discretion of the treaty–making 
powers and Congress to determine the nature of the relationship between a new-
ly acquired territory and the United States. Because Article IX of the Treaty of 
Paris provided that ‘[t]he civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants 
of the territories hereby ceded . . . shall be determined by the Congress,’ and 
Congress had not provided for the incorporation of Puerto Rico into the Union, 
Justice White concluded that Puerto Rico was an unincorporated territory. As 
such, the island was not a foreign country . . . .But it was ‘foreign to the United 
States in a domestic sense,’ insofar as it was not a member of the American 
political community. Because Puerto Rico was foreign to the United States un-
der the Constitution, it was a ‘necessary consequence’ that the Uniformity 
Clause was ‘not applicable to Congress in legislating for Porto Rico.’”). 
 123 See Cabranes, supra note 86, at 490. 
 124 See Bosniak, supra note 119, at 15. 
 125 QuickFacts: Puerto Rico, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov
/quickfacts/PR (last visited Oct. 31, 2021). 
 126 Bosniak, supra note 119, at 15. 
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tutional guarantees in some places, but not in others, particularly in 
the unincorporated territories.127 
III. THE ROAD TO UNITED STATES V. VAELLO-
MADERO 
To comprehend the significance of United States v. Vaello-
Madero, it is necessary to trace the legal history that has situated 
Puerto Rico within the American constitutional framework and has 
labeled it a dependency, rather than part of the United States. This 
section will provide an overview of historical context regarding 
how the United States approached governing the acquired territo-
ries and becoming a colonial authority. This section will also pro-
vide an account of the most significant jurisprudence dealing with 
the rights of the Puerto Rican people and the powers of the Island’s 
government in order to explain Vaello-Madero’s nuanced ac-
ceptance of the Insular Cases. 
Preconceptions in American legal, political, and social thinking 
at the beginning of the 20th century directly influenced the treat-
ment of the newly acquired territories and the rights of their inhab-
itants.128 The federal government and Puerto Rico continue to 
grapple with the consequences of the legal framework created from 
this basis of racial bias and preconceived notions of political and 
social underdevelopment in the territories.129 Therefore, to under-
stand the law, it is important to also understand the federal gov-
ernment’s actions at the beginning of the 20th century that led to 
the development of the Insular Cases doctrine.130 
                                                                                                             
 127 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 36, at 10–11. 
 128 See generally Frederic R. Coudert, Jr., Our New Peoples: Citizens, Sub-
jects, Nationals or Aliens, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 13, 13 (1903), for Coudert’s under-
standing of the “colonial problem” that the federal government faced after ac-
quiring the territories in 1898, highlighting the thinking of the era in prominent 
jurisprudential circles; see also Thompson, supra note 77, at 539. 
 129 Compare Issacharoff et al., supra note 27, at 5–7, for a concise summary 
of how Puerto Rico’s status, a product of the Insular Cases doctrine, affects 
multiple facets of life on the island. 
 130 See generally Torruella, supra note 29, at 65–73 (providing a historical 
and legal timeline of how and why the Insular Cases were decided). 
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A.  The Question of Territorial Governance in the Aftermath of 
the Spanish–American War 
Prior to the Spanish–American War, the United States focused 
on steady expansion of the national territory.131 Before “Manifest 
Destiny” emerged in the national lexicon, Americans relentlessly 
looked ambitiously to the West of the Mississippi for land and re-
sources.132 After “Manifest Destiny” became emblematic of U.S. 
expansionist ambitions, the United States waged the Mexican 
American War, from which the young nation acquired “five hun-
dred thousand square miles” and spread its borders “from the At-
lantic to the Pacific Ocean . . . .”133 Until the United States ac-
quired the Philippine Islands, Guam, and Puerto Rico, all the terri-
tories annexed since the founding of the Republic had become 
States of the Union.134 According to Professor Lanny Thompson, 
the United States had until then adhered to a “well established tra-
dition of territorial expansion,” which included significant profi-
ciency in “the subjugation of racial minorities on the continent.”135 
Thompson specifically refers to African Americans and Native 
Americans who had been segregated and treated as second class 
citizens, despite the existence of Due Process and Equal Protection 
assurances of the Fourteenth Amendment.136 
Territories acquired before the 20th century “had been intended 
as European American settler colonies . . . .” but these lands had 
                                                                                                             
 131 See id. at 60–62. 
 132 Id. at 61. The term, “Manifest Destiny,” was coined by newspaperman 
John Louis O’Sullivan and became “the rallying cry for U.S. expansionists in 
the nineteenth century.” Id. at 60. According to Judge. Torruella, the term “en-
capsulated a mantra of Darwinian imperialism, containing elements of geopoliti-
cal theory, religious righteousness, and economic entrepreneurship aimed at 
justifying territorial aggrandizement and the conquering, subjugation, and ab-
sorption of ‘inferior’ people and races ‘for their own good.’” Id. at 60–61. 
 133 Id. at 60–62. 
 134 See id. at 62. 
 135 Thompson, supra note 77, at 536–37 (“By the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, African Americans had been socially segregated and effectively excluded 
from political participation in many states, in spite of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Furthermore, American Indians had been decimated, expelled from their 
lands, or moved to Indian Territory or reservations; at the time they were con-
sidered wards of the U.S. government.”). 
 136 See id. at 537. 
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ultimately been admitted to the Union as states.137 Furthermore, 
Judge Torruella notes, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Scott v. 
Sanford, still valid when the Insular Cases were decided between 
1901–1922, “clearly expressed the lack of constitutional authority 
for the United States to rule as a colonial power . . . .”138 Notwith-
standing the Supreme Court’s pronouncements about the Repub-
lic’s lack of constitutional authority to act as a colonial authority, 
the United States faced an imperial conundrum when it acquired 
Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam.139 
In a 1903 Columbia Law Review article, Frederic Coudert, Jr. 
underscored that the country now controlled what he described as 
territories “inhabited by a settled population differing from us in 
race and civilization to such an extent that assimilation seems im-
possible, and varying among themselves in race, development, and 
culture to so great a degree as to make the application of any uni-
form political system difficult if not impracticable.”140 In the eyes 
of Americans of the time, the new territories were inhabited by 
peoples too culturally different and politically underdeveloped to 
deserve outright incorporation into the Union.141 Thus, the tradi-
tional model of territorial expansion by the addition of states would 
not be appropriate in the present situation.142 
i. The Territorial Acquisition and Governance Model Before 
1898 
The territories acquired after the Louisiana Purchase and the 
Mexican American War, for instance, were not as densely populat-
ed to trigger Coudert’s “imperial problem.”143 According to 
                                                                                                             
 137 Id. 
 138 Torruella, supra note 29, at 62. 
 139 Thompson, supra note 77, at 537. 
 140 Coudert, Jr., supra note 128, at 13. Coudert became a key player in the 
battleground over American imperialism when he launched two of the Insular 
Cases, DeLima v. Bidwell and Downes v. Bidwell. His impressions on the sub-
ject are key to an understanding of the legal and political thoughts surrounding 
the colonial issue at the beginning of the 20th century. 
 141 See id. 
 142 Cf. id. 
 143 See id. (“It is idle to attempt to find any adequate or guiding precedents in 
our former territorial acquisitions. The territories transferred from France and 
Mexico were not sufficiently populated to bring us face to face with the real 
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Coudert, aside from the fact that the number of people in the terri-
tories acquired from France and Mexico was insignificant, these 
peoples were “largely of Caucasian race and civilization” so that a 
persistent flow of immigration “soon made the new lands thor-
oughly American” and the question of imperialism became “aca-
demic.”144 More importantly, the concerns over cultural similarity 
and political sophistication as requisites to incorporation into the 
American system are salient in Coudert’s writing: 
[T]he two civilizations were in fact equal or nearly 
so, and the treaties, both of Paris (1800) and of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848), recognized that fact by 
according to the new inhabitants the rights of Amer-
ican citizens. Thus, the problem as to the legal sta-
tus of the inhabitants of Louisiana and the territory 
acquired from Mexico was solved or solved itself 
ab initio. The underlying theory upon which both 
treaties were based was expansion rather than impe-
rialism.145 
Before the acquisition of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philip-
pines, the United States could overpower cultural differences and 
what they viewed as political underdevelopment with significant 
population movement.146 This method of social engineering trans-
                                                                                                             
imperial problem, i.e., the domination over men of one order or kind of civiliza-
tion by men of a different and higher civilization. The Nomad tribes of America 
presented indeed a problem, but only a passing one . . . .Necessity and the ruth-
less progress of civilization compelled the opening up and exploiting of the 
American continent by the overflowing population of Old Europe. The Indian 
problem was met by taking the land, whether as the result of a bargain or 
through force as the white man needed it, and the relations of the newcomer 
with his Nimrod predecessor were gradually reduced to a minor question 
through the agencies of fire water, gunpowder, and well–intended but unwise 
policy.”). 
 144 Id. at 14. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Paul Frymer, “A Rush and a Push and the Land Is Ours”: Territorial 
Expansion, Land Policy, and U.S. State Formation, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 119, 119 
(2014). According to Professor Frymer, the United States accomplished territo-
rial expansion in three phases, including: (1) an assertion by the federal govern-
ment of legal sovereignty over the “nation’s continental borders through a series 
of diplomatic treatises and purchases signed with recognized nation states . . . .”; 
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formed the character of the population itself, making it more 
“American;” alternatively, military force could be used to extermi-
nate or forcefully relocate entire populations that did not corre-
spond within the “American” archetype.147 As a result, the United 
States could calculate demographic patterns in the sparsely popu-
lated and culturally similar territories to make annexation, and the 
path towards statehood, clearer for the new lands.148 However, this 
model of expansionism was made obsolete in 1898.149 
When the federal government faced integration of a larger, 
more heterogeneous group of people, it had to make decisions re-
garding how it “‘imagined’ the national community” as a product 
of the political treatment given to the new lands.150 This situation 
is more reminiscent of the types of encounters the United States 
faced with the acquisition of the Spanish colonies in 1898.151 Pro-
fessor Paul Frymer underscores the saliency of concerns regarding 
the race of the inhabitants in the newly acquired territories.152 He 
points out that “naturalization laws extended to all Europeans, ena-
bling the relatively swift incorporation of the French population in 
Louisiana and Germans [sic] settlers in Wisconsin.”153 Meanwhile, 
he highlights how non–Europeans were given a different kind of 
treatment; for instance, the Indian Removal Act of 1830 “mandated 
nearly one hundred thousand people leave their homes for lands 
                                                                                                             
(2) treaties and “military actions” against Native Americans to “remove hun-
dreds of thousands of people who lived on and held property rights over the 
land”; and (3) advancement of “a domestic policy agenda” engineered to pro-
mote the population, settlement and incorporation of “the vast geographic space 
into what became, by 1912, the first 48 states.” Id. 
 147 Id. (“During the first half of the nineteenth century, the territory of the 
United States nearly tripled in size as the nation expanded across the continent 
from thirteen Atlantic–side states south to the Rio Grande and west to the Pacif-
ic Ocean.”). 
 148 See id. 
 149 See Coudert, Jr., supra note 128, at 13. 
 150 Frymer, supra note 146, at 120 (“[S]hould these populations be incorpo-
rated, should they be removed to areas beyond the incorporated border, or 
should the nation stop expanding and leave certain populations on the other side 
of the border? All three of these options were chosen at different times, and race 
was a critical intervening factor.”). 
 151 See Coudert, Jr., supra note 128, at 18. 
 152 See Frymer, supra note 146, at 120. 
 153 Id. 
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across the Mississippi River, with reported casualties in the tens of 
thousands” in direct contravention of democratic ideals.154 
Coudert contrasts the situations where the United States ac-
quired sparsely populated land, or where the population was most-
ly of European ancestry, calling for the three–part process Frymer 
describes, with that which the republic faced after the Spanish–
American War.155 Coudert states that the question about the gov-
ernance of the acquired Spanish colonies: 
[C]annot be solved either by extermination, as in 
the case of the Indian, nor by assimilation, as in the 
case of the few Frenchmen and Spaniards. Neither 
the methods of Miles Standish nor those of Jeffer-
son will suffice us now. We must move on a hereto-
fore untrodden path and seek for precedent upon 
which to base intelligent legislation . . . not in our 
own history, but in that of other nations who have 
preceded us in attempting to govern non–
assimilable peoples.156 
Consequently, inherent in the approach to how to incorporate 
the acquired territories after the Spanish–American War, there is a 
notion of “otherness” permeating political and national thought at 
the beginning of the 20th century.157 This notion emphasizes “non–
assimilable” cultural differences and presumed political underde-
velopment in the acquired territories.158 “Otherness,” as a concept, 
helps explain the justifications given for embracing a colonial ap-
proach to the governance of the acquired territories159 and the rea-
sons for not applying all constitutional guarantees in these lands.160 
                                                                                                             
 154 Id. 
 155 See Coudert, Jr., supra note 128, at 14. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Thompson, supra note 77, at 538. 
 158 See id. 
 159 See id. at 539–40 (“No doubt the culture of imperialism in the United 
States drew upon and extended the continental colonial experience in the elabo-
ration of the fundamental alterity of the subject peoples in general. [I]t would 
seem that the cultural representations of the period . . . demonstrated an acute 
awareness of the exceptional diversity of the peoples newly under U.S. domin-
ion. Thus, alterity was not only a homogeneous notion, as most of the literature 
has suggested, but was simultaneously a thoroughly differentiated and hierar-
116 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1 
 
ii. The Colonial Acquisition and Governance Model Emerges 
after 1898 
In the case of Puerto Rico and the Philippines, the territories 
“belonged to, but were not a part of, the body politic of the repub-
lic” because of the preconceived notion that the islands were “in-
habited by peoples of fundamentally different ‘races’ and ‘civiliza-
tions who were not capable of self–government.’”161 Professor 
Lanny Thompson highlights that the organic laws of these territo-
ries—the Foraker Act, the Jones–Shafroth Act, and Public Law 
600 in Puerto Rico’s case—were watershed moments in the trends 
underlying American expansionism.162 These laws essentially cre-
ated the new system of American imperial colonialism and were a 
byproduct of racial biases and misconceptions about the levels of 
social and political development in the territories.163 Prior to the 
acquisition of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines, the federal 
government pursued expansion through European–American set-
tlement and establishing cultural and political hegemony; this pro-
cess frequently led to statehood for the acquired lands.164 
However, the new territories received a new kind of treatment, 
reminiscent of that under the Indian Removal Act of 1830, because 
                                                                                                             
chical one. [T]he proposition of the homogeneous other fails to explicate the 
connections between particular representations of subject peoples and the specif-
ic patterns of imperial rule. This is due to the impossibility of addressing differ-
ences in imperial rule based upon a theory of the homogeneous construction of 
the colonial other.”). 
 160 See id. at 549–51. 
 161 Id. at 573. 
 162 Id. (“[F]rom colonialism via settlement to imperialism via political do-
minion.”). 
 163 Thompson, supra note 77, at 574 (“The creation of different governments 
for Hawai’i, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam followed the general prin-
ciple that operated throughout the imperial archipelago: The multiple imperial 
subjects were to be ruled differently, according to their level of civilization and 
capacity for self–government.”). 
 164 Id. at 573 (“Of the insular territories, only Hawai’i approximated the 
continental experience of European American settlement and local hegemony. 
For this reason, Hawai’i was the only new territory to be incorporated into the 
United States and eventually (1959) to be admitted as a state. Hawai’i, then, was 
a distant frontier of European American settlement, and this distinguished it 
from the former Spanish colonies acquired in 1898.”). 
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of “essential difference[s]” from previous continental territories.165 
Among these differences, Thompson notes, were their geograph-
ical separation from the continental United States, tropical charac-
ter, dense population, and “alien races,” the combination of which 
created an “inhospitable” environment for potential American im-
migrants.166 Thus, Puerto Rico and the Philippines were treated 
more like British colonies than incorporated territories, like Ha-
wai’i.167 Thompson explains the political dominion of the territo-
ries acquired in 1898: 
The basic structure of these imperial governments 
resembled that of a territorial government, but one 
firmly under the control of appointed European 
American administrators. The executive branch in-
cluded a presidentially appointed governor and an 
appointed executive commission. The legislative 
branch was composed of the same executive com-
mission, which functioned as the upper house, and a 
lower house of elected representatives. However, 
while Congress integrated Puerto Rico into the 
commercial and judicial systems of the United 
States, it excluded the Philippines as a foreign port, 
with its own currency, and did not make it subject 
to U.S. statutes or courts. This followed from the 
conclusion that Puerto Rico might somehow become 
“Americanized,” but that the Philippines could nev-
er be assimilated.168 
Furthermore, under General George Davis’s recommendations 
regarding the establishment of a civil government in Puerto Rico, 
the Island would first resemble a British crown colony, but should 
                                                                                                             
 165 Id. at 554. 
 166 Id. at 555. 
 167 See id. at 555, 557 (“Gen George Davis, then military governor of Puerto 
Rico, also drew upon British colonial models . . . .He quickly rejected the model 
of the independent nation, giving a decidedly unfavorable review of the Domini-
can Republic. He suggested that the colonial model most appropriate for Puerto 
Rico was Trinidad, a crown colony with only a partially elected legislative as-
sembly.”). 
 168 Id. at 573 (emphasis added). 
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eventually develop “responsible representative institutions, com-
bined with elements of the U.S. territorial government.”169 Accord-
ing to Thompson, General Davis’s recommendations for Puerto 
Rico’s civil government would create a “‘dependency’ and decid-
edly not a territory destined for ‘final incorporation within the 
American Union,’ or, statehood.”170 
“Otherness,” nonetheless, is not the sole explanation to the de-
cision to treat the new territories as colonies and the concept can-
not independently explain “the particular manifestations of imperi-
al rule in different sites.”171 However, “otherness” is a prime ex-
ample of the type of racial bias contributing to preconceived un-
derstanding of the new peoples in the territories.172 Thompson re-
minds us that “cultural representations—frequently expressed in 
gendered, infantilized, and racialized vocabularies—played a fun-
damental role in the conception, establishment, and justification of 
different forms of rule” in the new territories.173 These understand-
ings, in turn, led to the decision to create a sort of inferior citizen-
ship for Puerto Ricans, without fully equal rights, and which con-
tinues to impact the relationship between the United States and 
Puerto Rico.174 
There is no better example of the inferior status of Puerto Ri-
cans within the United States’ legal framework than the federal 
government’s contention that the Constitution allows Congress to 
treat the territories differently from the states.175 Congress derived 
the authority to relegate territorial citizens to a secondary class be-
cause of the development of the “longest standing constitutional 
                                                                                                             
 169 Thompson, supra note 77, at 557–58. 
 170 Id. at 558. 
 171 Id. at 538 (“[T]his ‘doctrine of incorporation’ was based upon symbolic 
construction of ‘alien peoples’ different from and inferior to European Ameri-
cans. However, [this] legal analysis does not explain why Congress ‘incorpo-
rated’ Hawai’i—by means of a conventional territorial government—or why 
different governments were created for each of the unincorporated territories—
Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam.”). 
 172 Cf. Coudert, Jr., supra note 128, at 13 (demonstrating how the differences 
between civilized nations like the United States and uncivilized and exotic lo-
cales like the acquired territories created confusion regarding the best approach 
to govern the new lands). 
 173 Thompson, supra note 77, at 574. 
 174 Cabranes, supra note 86, at 403. 
 175 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 36, at 11. 
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aberration in the history of the Supreme Court”: The Insular Cases 
doctrine.176 
B. The Insular Cases Doctrine: Does the Constitution 
“Follow the Flag?” 
The Insular Cases constitutionalized “the existence of a second 
class of citizens not entitled to all the protections afforded other 
citizens on the mainland.”177 Congress was able to pass the Fo-
raker and Jones–Shafroth legislation, as well as Public Law 600 
and Public Law 447, treating Puerto Rico as an unincorporated 
territory under the powers conferred to it by the Insular Cases.178 
Even under the now discredited Scott v. Sandford decision of 1857, 
the Supreme Court was adamant that, while the United States had 
constitutional power to “expand the territory of the United States” 
by “the acquisition of territory,” it must be acquired with the inten-
tion of admitting the territory into the Union “and not to be held as 
a colony and governed by Congress with absolute authority.”179 
Chief Justice Taney’s opinion continued: 
Taking this rule to guide us, it may be safely as-
sumed that citizens of the United States who mi-
grate to a Territory belonging to the people of the 
United States, cannot be ruled as mere colonists de-
pendent upon the will of the General Government, 
and to be governed by any laws it may think proper 
to impose. The principle upon which our Govern-
ment rests, and upon which alone they continue to 
exist, is the union of States, sovereign and inde-
                                                                                                             
 176 Gabriel A. Terrasa, The United States, Puerto Rico, and the Territorial 
Incorporation Doctrine: Reaching a Century of Constitutional Authoritarianism, 
31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 55, 56–57 (1997). 
 177 Id. at 85 (“Puerto Ricans . . . are denied the Sixth Amendment right to 
trial by jury, the right to vote for President and Vice–President of the United 
States, and the right to equal treatment with respect to welfare benefits. The 
welfare cases . . . underscore the amount of deference given to Congress by the 
Supreme Court when legislating for the territories.”). 
 178 See Cabranes, supra note 86, at 436 (“In resolving these controversies [of 
the Insular Cases] the Court upheld the power of Congress to treat the islands 
acquired from Spain differently from the ‘incorporated territories.’”). 
 179 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 447 (1857). 
120 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1 
 
pendent within their own limits in their internal and 
domestic concerns, and bound together as one peo-
ple by a General Government, possessing certain 
enumerated and restricted powers . . . .A power, 
therefore, in the General Government to obtain and 
hold colonies and dependent territories, over which 
they might legislate without restriction, would be 
inconsistent with its own existence in its present 
form.180 
Thus, under Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Scott, the federal 
government may not perpetually bind itself to a territory by estab-
lishing a colonial government.181 The powers of the Territorial 
Clause, as a result, were meant to be used as transitional tools in 
the acquired territories to provide “some Government . . . in order 
to organize society, and to protect the inhabitants in their persons 
and property” until sufficient organization had occurred, and popu-
lation accumulated, so that the territory could “assume the position 
to which it was destined among the States of the Union.”182 It is 
evident, then, that the Puerto Rican experience in the American 
constitutional framework is the product of a profound distortion of 
these governing principles of territorial governance.183 
Notwithstanding such pronouncements in Scott, which is now 
discredited and described as “evil in constitutional law” because of 
its distortion of constitutional principles to serve pro–slavery advo-
cates,184 the Insular Cases granted Congress “omnipotent plenary 
powers” to govern the acquired territories as colonies.185 Standing 
in full contrast to Chief Justice Taney’s language in Scott, Justice 
Brown in Downes v. Bidwell 186 asserts: 
                                                                                                             
 180 Id. at 447–48. 
 181 See id. 
 182 Id. at 448. 
 183 See Torruella, supra note 29, at 73. 
 184 Paul Finkelman, Scott v. Sandford: The Court’s Most Dreadful Case and 
How It Changed History, 82 CHI.–KENT L. REV. 3, 3 (2007). Scott v. Sandford 
was overruled by the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dredd Scott 
Decision Still Resonates Today, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (Mar. 6, 2020), 
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/dred-scott-decision-still-resonates-today-2/. 
 185 Torruella, supra note 29, at 73. 
 186 See generally Downes, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) (authorizing Congress to 
pass, under the Foraker Act, tax provisions that “would have been clearly un-
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That the power over the territories is vested in Con-
gress without limitation, and that this power has 
been considered the foundation upon which the ter-
ritorial governments rest, was also asserted by Chief 
Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland . . . .So, 
too, in Mormon Church v. United States.187 
Justice Brown invokes Justice Bradley’s assertion in Mormon 
Church: 
The power of Congress over the territories of the 
United States is general and plenary, arising from 
and incidental to the right to acquire the territory it-
self, and from the power given by the Constitution 
to make all needful rules and regulations respecting 
the territory . . . .It would be absurd to hold that the 
United States has power to acquire territory, and no 
power to govern it when acquired. The territory of 
Louisiana . . . and the territories west of the Rocky 
Mountains . . . became the absolute property and 
domain of the United States . . . .Having rightfully 
acquired said territories, the United States govern-
ment was the only one which could impose laws 
upon them, and its sovereignty over them was com-
plete . . . .188 
The Downes plurality concluded that Congress was constitu-
tionally enabled to determine not only when, but also how far con-
stitutional protections attach to the inhabitants of the territories.189 
As a result, Congress was free to “create non–uniform revenue 
laws for unincorporated territories, such as Puerto Rico.”190 The 
Downes plurality thus resolved the question of whether the Consti-
                                                                                                             
constitutional for a U.S. state” because of the Uniformity Clause of Article I of 
the Constitution, requiring the uniform collection of federal taxes in the states); 
see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“[A]ll Duties, Imposts, and Excises shall be 
uniform throughout the United States . . . .”). 
 187 Downes, 182 U.S. at 268 (citations omitted). 
 188 Id. (quoting Late Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ v. United States, 136 
U.S. 1 (1889)) (emphasis added). 
 189 Id. at 278–79. 
 190 Dick, supra note 4, at 33–34. 
122 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1 
 
tution “follows the flag”: it does not do so automatically. More 
specifically, as Professor Marybeth Herald argues, whether the 
Constitution follows wherever the U.S. flag is raised depends on 
“whether the territory is destined for statehood and whether the 
constitutional right in question is fundamental.”191 
Downes also stands for the proposition that there are certain 
natural rights in the Constitution that apply in the territories even 
without explicit extension by Congress.192 Justice White explains 
in his concurrence: 
Whilst, therefore, there is no express or implied lim-
itation on Congress in exercising its power to create 
local governments for any and all of the territories, 
by which that body is restrained from the widest lat-
itude of discretion, it does not follow that there may 
not be inherent, although unexpressed, principles 
which are the basis of all free government which 
cannot be with impunity transcended.193 
Therefore, the Insular Cases doctrine appears to contain certain 
protections for the territories’ inhabitants against despotism.194 
Nonetheless these “unexpressed” constitutional guarantees are 
highly malleable and the federal judiciary benefits from the un-
fixed nature of these protections as they apply to the territories to 
reach “creative” decisions when an act of Congress is chal-
lenged.195 Accordingly, “[w]hat particular provisions [of the Con-
stitution] apply depends on ‘the situation of the territory and its 
relation to the United States.’”196 
According to Justice White, the United States has the inherent 
right as a sovereign nation to determine which constitutional guar-
antees apply in the territories.197 It is unsurprising that the Consti-
                                                                                                             
 191 Herald, supra note 45, at 709. 
 192 Rivera Ramos, supra note 31, at 246. 
 193 Downes, 182 U.S. at 290–91 (White, J., concurring). 
 194 See id. 
 195 See, e.g., Herald, supra note 45, at 709. 
 196 Rivera Ramos, supra note 31, at 248. 
 197 See Downes, 182 U.S. at 302 (citing American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. 
511, 542 (1828) (“If [conquered territory] be ceded by the treaty, the acquisition 
is confirmed, and the ceded territory becomes a part of the nation to which it is 
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tution did not follow the flag to Puerto Rico when it came under 
possession of the United States or when a civilian government was 
established.198 The integration of Puerto Rico into the constitution-
al framework of the United States did not envisage its eventual 
admission into the Union as a state.199 Rather, Puerto Rico has al-
ways been treated as a perpetual colony, and any grants of auton-
omy handed to the Island’s government have been undergirded by 
the understanding that all insular authority emanates from Con-
gress.200 As a result, Puerto Rico remains an unincorporated terri-
tory of the United States.201 It is this unincorporated status that 
operates to prevent the full application of the Constitution in Puer-
to Rico.202 
i. The Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation 
An important corollary to the discussion of Congress’s om-
nipotent plenary powers over the territories and the application of 
fundamental constitutional rights in these lands is whether Con-
gress has enacted legislation that incorporates such territories into 
the Union.203 This concept, known as the doctrine of “territorial 
incorporation,” was established by the Supreme Court in the Insu-
lar Cases and “distinguishes between incorporated territories, 
which are intended for statehood from the time of acquisition and 
in which the entire Constitution applies ex proprio vigore, and un-
incorporated territories, which are not intended for statehood and 
in which only fundamental constitutional rights apply by their own 
force.”204 While the Downes judgment provided a floor of constitu-
                                                                                                             
annexed, either on the terms stipulated in the treaty of cession, or on such as its 
new master shall impose.”)). 
 198 See Cabranes, supra note 86, at 427. 
 199 See id. 
 200 See Torruella, supra note 29, at 82 (“What we have in this relationship is 
not the subordination of Puerto Rico’s political power to that of the United 
States, but rather the lack of any political power by Puerto Rico vis–à–vis the 
United States.”). 
 201 See id.; see also Rivera Ramos, supra note 31, at 235. 
 202 Cf. Sam Erman, Citizens of Empire: Puerto Rico, Status, and Constitu-
tional Change, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1238 (2014) (summarizing the im-
portance of Justice White’s incorporation doctrine in Downes and its effects on 
the application of constitutional guarantees in unincorporated territories). 
 203 See Herald, supra note 45, at 709. 
 204 Northern Mariana Islands v. Atalig, 723 F.2d 682, 688 (9th Cir. 1984). 
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tional guarantees, even though it did not say explicitly which ones, 
Justice White’s concurrence offered a more expansive view of 
Congress’s freedom to act in the territories.205 Furthermore, ac-
cording to a unanimous Supreme Court in Balzac v. Porto Rico, 
neither the Foraker nor Jones–Shafroth legislation incorporated 
Puerto Rico into the Union.206 According to then Chief Justice 
Taft: 
[I]t is just as clearly settled that [the Sixth and Sev-
enth Amendments] do not apply to territory belong-
ing to the United States which has not been incorpo-
rated into the Union. It was further settled in 
Downes v. Bidwell and confirmed by Dorr v. United 
States that neither the Philippines nor Porto Rico 
was territory which had been incorporated in the 
Union or become a part of the United States, as dis-
tinguished from merely belonging to it; and that the 
acts giving temporary governments to the Philip-
pines and to Porto Rico had no such effect.207 
Additionally, the creation of the Commonwealth and the Con-
stitution of Puerto Rico with Public Law 600 has not altered the 
unincorporated status of the Island.208 As a result, only those con-
stitutional protections which are deemed “fundamental”209 and 
those which are explicitly extended by a grant of Congress are ap-
plicable to the territories.210 
                                                                                                             
 205 See Herald, supra note 45, at 715 (quoting Downes, 182 U.S. at 282–83 
(White, J., concurring)). 
 206 See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 305 (1922). 
 207 Id. at 304–05 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 208 See R.B.S., supra note 103, at 1068 (“The reality, if not the legal defini-
tion, of Puerto Rico’s status has been something between colony and independ-
ence, similar to statehood, but not the same. Certainly, it is unlikely that the 
Supreme Court would reverse an act of Congress granting self–government to 
American citizens. However, it is equally unlikely that the Court would block a 
later attempt by Congress to reassert its territorial powers. The lapse of time and 
the anticolonial spirit of the day are perhaps the best advocates for the irrevoca-
bility of the compact.”). 
 209 Another hotly debated issue in the Supreme Court and beyond the scope 
of this note. 
 210 See Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 192 P.R. Dec. 594, 645 (2015). 
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ii. A Bill of Rights for Puerto Rico: The Supreme Court 
Defends Fundamental Constitutional Guarantees for 
Unincorporated Territories 
Justice Brown’s plurality opinion in Downes had already dis-
tinguished between “certain natural rights,” of a fundamental char-
acter, “and what may be termed artificial or remedial rights,” spe-
cific to the American common law system.211 Furthermore, among 
the class of rights which Downes considered “natural” or funda-
mental were: “[T]he right to personal liberty and individual proper-
ty; to freedom of speech and of the press; to free access to courts of 
justice, to due process of law and to an equal protection of the 
laws . . . and to such other immunities as are indispensable to a free 
government.”212 Justice Brown continued: 
Whatever may be finally decided by the American 
people as to the status of these islands and their in-
habitants . . . it does not follow that, in the mean-
time, awaiting that decision, the people are in the 
matter of personal rights unprotected by the provi-
sions of our Constitution, and subject to the merely 
arbitrary control of Congress. Even if regarded as 
aliens, they are entitled under the principles of the 
Constitution to be protected in life, liberty, and 
property.213 
The Jones–Shafroth legislation of 1917 included a bill of rights 
providing that “[N]o law shall be enacted in Porto Rico which shall 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process 
of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the 
laws.”214 According to Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Examining 
Board of Engineers v. Flores De Otero, the 1917 bill of rights 
“provided Puerto Ricans with nearly all the personal guarantees 
found in the United States Constitution.”215 Furthermore, Justice 
Blackmun notes that the wording of the bill of rights in the Jones–
                                                                                                             
 211 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 282 (1901). 
 212 Id. (emphasis added). 
 213 Id. at 283. 
 214 Jones–Shafroth Act, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951, 951 (1917). 
 215 Examining Bd. of Eng’rs v. Flores De Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 591 (1976). 
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Shafroth Act was “almost identical with the language of the Four-
teenth Amendment; and when Congress selected them, it must 
have done so with the Fourteenth Amendment in mind . . . .”216 
Despite the repeal of the 1917 bill of rights by Public Law 600, 
under Downes and Flores De Otero, the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment and the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment apply to the residents of 
Puerto Rico.217 As a result, notwithstanding the fact that Puerto 
Rico is an unincorporated territory of the United States and unlike-
ly to achieve statehood, the plenary and omnipotent territorial 
powers extended to Congress under the Insular Cases do not allow 
the federal government to deprive Puerto Rican residents of the 
equal protection of the laws.218 
iii. Wabol v. Villacrusis: How the Insular Cases Doctrine 
Threatens the Most Fundamental Constitutional Guarantees in 
the Territories 
Professor Herald’s assertion that constitutional protections may 
apply in the territories if the rights in question are fundamental 
requires further scrutiny. Even though the Insular Cases recog-
nized equal protection of the laws as a fundamental right and ap-
plicable in unincorporated territories, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has found that equal protection guarantees do not auto-
matically apply.219 In a bizarre decision, the Ninth Circuit placed 
the “pledge to preserve and protect” the culture and property of the 
                                                                                                             
 216 Id. at 591–92. 
 217 Id. at 600. 
 218 See id. at 600–01 (“The Court recognized the applicability of these guar-
antees as long ago as its decisions in Downes v. Bidwell, and Balzac v. Porto 
Rico. The principle was reaffirmed and strengthened in Reid v. Covert and then 
again in Calero-Toledo, where we held that the inhabitants of Puerto Rico are 
protected, under either the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth . . . .”). 
 219 Herald, supra note 45, at 712 (“The Ninth Circuit held that equal protec-
tion guarantees do not fully bind the United States government in the [Northern 
Mariana Islands], or, more specifically, that the Congress could mandate a race–
based land alienation restriction in the NMI without even the minimal con-
straints of rational relationship review.”); see also Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 
F.2d 1450, 1459 (9th Cir. 1992) (“It is well established that the entire Constitu-
tion applies to a United States territory ex proprio vigore—of its own force—
only if that territory is ‘incorporated.’ Elsewhere, absent congressional exten-
sion, only ‘fundamental’ constitutional rights apply in the territory.”). 
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Northern Mariana Islands above the guarantees of equal protection 
of the laws.220 Instead of holding that equal protection applies to 
the territories as a fundamental constitutional right, defeasible only 
by fulfilling the requisites of strict scrutiny, the Ninth Circuit basi-
cally eliminated these guarantees for the territories.221 
Judge Poole, for the Ninth Circuit, distinguished between the 
application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the states and its ap-
plication to unincorporated territories, like the Commonwealth of 
the Northern Mariana Islands.222 According to Judge Poole: 
What is fundamental for purposes of Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporation is that which “is neces-
sary to an Anglo–American regime of ordered liber-
ty. In contrast, “fundamental” within the territory 
clause are “‘those . . . limitations in favor of person-
al rights’ which are ‘the basis of all free govern-
ment.’” In the territorial context, the definition of a 
basic and integral freedom must narrow to incorpo-
rate the shared beliefs of diverse cultures. Thus, the 
asserted constitutional guarantee against discrimina-
tion . . . applies only if this guarantee is fundamen-
tal in the international sense.223 
The Ninth Circuit refused to apply equal protection guarantees 
in the Northern Mariana Islands, and instead relied on an “imprac-
tical and anomalous” standard crafted in Justice Harlan’s concur-
rence in Reid v. Covert, using Balzac, part of the Insular Cases, as 
an authority for the standard.224 Under Justice Harlan’s standard, a 
court is supplied the tools “for finding a delicate balance between 
                                                                                                             
 220 Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1462 (“The Bill of Rights was not intended to inter-
fere with the performance of our international obligations. Nor was it intended 
to operate as a genocide pact for diverse native cultures.”). 
 221 See Herald, supra note 45, at 712 (“The Wabol court’s endorsement of a 
broad exemption for the United Congress from equal protection constraints 
when dealing with territories opens the door to future exemptions from other 
constitutional constraints on government action in the territories.”). 
 222 Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1460. 
 223 Id. (emphasis added). 
 224 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74–75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring); see 
also Herald, supra note 45, at 717. 
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local diversity and constitutional command . . . .”225 and can refuse 
to extend even a fundamental constitutional protection if it is found 
to be impractical and anomalous in the territory.226 According to 
Professor Herald, the Ninth Circuit’s decision is astonishing “be-
cause the principle of equal protection embodies far more than 
procedural rights, and is one of the most basic and fundamental 
principles” of the Constitution.227 
Nonetheless, it is clear from the example of the Northern Mari-
ana Islands, and the principles put forth by the Insular Cases, that 
Congress is the gatekeeper of Constitutional rights for the territo-
ries.228 Justice Harlan expressed this sentiment clearly in his ex-
planation for the necessity of the “impractical and anomalous” 
standard: 
[T]he Insular Cases do stand for an important prop-
osition, one which seems to me a wise and neces-
sary gloss on our Constitution. The proposition 
is . . . not that the Constitution “does not apply” 
overseas, but that there are provisions in the Consti-
tution which do not necessarily apply in all circum-
stances in every foreign place. In other words, it 
seems to me that the basic teaching of . . . the Insu-
lar Cases is that there is no rigid and abstract rule 
that Congress . . . must exercise [power] subject to 
all the guarantees of the Constitution, no matter 
what the conditions and considerations are that 
                                                                                                             
 225 Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1461. 
 226 Id. at 1462 (“We think it is clear that interposing this constitutional provi-
sion would be both impractical and anomalous in this setting. Absent the aliena-
tion restriction, the political union would not be possible. Thus, application of 
the constitutional right could ultimately frustrate the mutual interests that led to 
the Covenant. It would also hamper the United States’ ability to form political 
alliances and acquire necessary military outposts. For the NMI people, the 
equalization of access would be a hollow victory if it led to the loss of their land, 
their cultural and social identity, and the benefits of United States sovereign-
ty.”); see also Terrasa, supra note 176, at 89 (“The Ninth Circuit appeared to 
suggest, as the Supreme Court had in the Insular Cases, that necessity, expedi-
ency, and convenience determined which rights were ‘fundamental’ for the pur-
pose of territorial incorporation.”). 
 227 Herald, supra note 45, at 712. 
 228 See id. at 714. 
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would make adherence to a specific guarantee alto-
gether impracticable and anomalous.229 
It is precisely the lack of any rigid or abstract rule in the Insu-
lar Cases doctrine regarding the application of the Constitution in 
the territories that has led to the overexpansion of the doctrine.230 
One commentator has explained the workings of the “impractical 
and anomalous” standard and its dangers: 
If a constitutional claim arises in a land over which 
the United States exercises absolute control . . . and 
if the court deems that the claim involves a “funda-
mental meaning” of the Constitution, then the court 
should apply the same standard abroad as would 
apply if the claim had arisen domestically. But the 
court should apply an intermediate standard if only 
one of these conditions is met; under this intermedi-
ate standard, the court should apply the Constitution 
abroad just as it would apply domestically unless 
doing so would be “impractical and anomalous.” 
A significant weakness in this framework, however, 
is the ambiguity of the “impracticable and anoma-
lous” standard. Indeed, the syntactic structure of 
the . . . standard is still unclear, as the Court has not 
clarified whether it is a disjunctive or conjunctive 
standard, and there is also confusion about the 
standard’s semantic content, since the Court has 
provided little insight into what these words mean 
                                                                                                             
 229 Reid, 354 U.S. at 74–75 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 230 See Jesse Merriam, A Clarification of the Constitution’s Application 
Abroad: Making the Impracticable and Anomalous Standard More Practicable 
and Less Anomalous, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 171, 187 (2012), for a dis-
cussion of how the “impracticable and anomalous” standard emerged from the 
Insular Cases even though the cases do not explicitly employ this language. See 
also Erman, supra note 202, at 1234 (“Coudert described the Insular Cases as 
presenting the Supreme Court a choice between its ‘reverence for the Constitu-
tion’ and allowing ‘the United States properly to govern a people so alien.’ 
These two conflicting desires . . . ‘were reconciled by [an] ingenious and origi-
nal doctrine.’ The key strength of the doctrine: its ‘very vagueness . . . was valu-
able.’”). 
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in this context. With so many ambiguities, the doc-
trine itself is impracticable because judges cannot 
apply it objectively and predictably, and it is also 
anomalous in the Court’s constitutional jurispru-
dence, because although many judicial doctrines 
contain some ambiguity, it is difficult to think of 
one of whose semantic content and syntactic struc-
ture are this amorphous.231 
Taken to their logical extreme by capitalizing on their amor-
phous nature, the Insular Cases doctrine and its progeny, like the 
“impractical and anomalous” standard, can potentially classify any 
constitutional guarantee as non–fundamental, and thus excused 
from Congressional consideration when exercising its powers over 
unincorporated territories.232 The answer to the question of wheth-
er the Constitution follows the flag thus changes from “it depends” 
to “only when Congress wants it to.”233 
As Professor Herald notes, the principle established by the In-
sular Cases and the Ninth Circuit is “boundless and dangerous be-
cause the test defers to the negotiating parties to decide whether 
equal protection guarantees or perhaps any other constitutional 
restraint should protect individual rights and bridle governmental 
                                                                                                             
 231 Merriam, supra note 230, at 173–74. 
 232 Herald, supra note 45, at 712. 
 233 C.f. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922) (“The Constitution of 
the United States is in force in Porto Rico as it is wherever and whenever the 
sovereign power of that government is exerted. The Constitution, however, con-
tains grants of power and limitations which in the nature of things are not always 
and everywhere applicable, and the real issue in the Insular Cases was not 
whether the Constitution extended to the Philippines or Porto Rico when we 
went there, but which of its provisions were applicable by way of limitation 
upon the exercise of executive and legislative power in dealing with new condi-
tions and requirements.”) (emphasis added); Denniston, supra note 42 (explain-
ing how federal courts of appeal have relied upon the Insular Cases for the 
proposition that the Constitution applies selectively to the territories, and it is 
Congress who decides what rights territorial citizens receive); Brief for Petition-
er, supra note 36, at 10 (“Long ago, [the Supreme Court] held that the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment concerns ‘persons and classes 
of persons’ rather than places, and that the government thus remains free to es-
tablish ‘one system for one portion of its territory and another system for anoth-
er portion.’”) (citations omitted). 
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action in a territory.”234 Consequently, as is evident in Wabol, the 
Insular Cases recognized Congress’s ability to treat the territories 
as analogous to “British crown colon[ies]” rather than “a republi-
can State of America.”235 
iv. The Legacy of the Insular Cases: How 19th Century 
Racism Deprives Present Day Americans of Their 
Constitutional Rights 
The Insular Cases showcase the “racial bias that permeated 
U.S. society at the turn of the century,” and which directly contrib-
uted to the reasoning behind the Cases and the contravention of the 
Constitution.236 According to Rivera Ramos, the Insular Cases 
support “a certain vision of democracy” in which political partici-
pation is regarded as a privilege and not a right.237 The prominent 
19th century political scientist and constitutional theorist John W. 
Burgess stated: “The Teutonic nations238 can never regard the ex-
ercise of political power as a right of man; such a right must be 
based on political capacity of which the Teutonic nations are the 
only qualified judges.”239 According to Rivera Ramos: 
One thing is to acquire territory, to incorporate that 
territory into the nation is quite another . . . .To in-
corporate implies a decision to share with the alien 
                                                                                                             
 234 Herald, supra note 45, at 713. 
 235 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 279 (1901). 
 236 Torruella, supra note 29, at 58–59; see also Downes, 182 U.S. at 279–80 
(“There seems to be no middle ground between this position and the doctrine 
that if [the territories’] inhabitants do not become, immediately upon annexation, 
citizens of the United States, their children thereafter born, whether savages or 
civilized, are such, and entitled to all the rights . . . of citizens. If such be their 
status, the consequences will be extremely serious. [I]t is doubtful if Congress 
would ever assent to the annexation of territory upon the condition that its in-
habitants, however foreign they may be to our habits, traditions and modes of 
life, shall become at once citizens . . . .”). 
 237 Rivera Ramos, supra note 31, at 293. 
 238 Burgess employed the labels of “Teutonic nations” or the “North” to refer 
to nations composed of mostly White men, as opposed to non–Anglo–Saxon 
races, which he considered “unpolitical and barbaric.” See id. 
 239 Id. (quoted in RUBIN F. WESTON, RACISM IN U.S. IMPERIALISM: THE 
INFLUENCE OF RACIAL ASSUMPTIONS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 1893–
1946 16 (1972)). 
132 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1 
 
people “the rights which peculiarly belong to the 
citizens of the United States.” Incorporation, then, 
means bringing the “other” into the political com-
munity that was designed for the “we.” Again, de-
mocracy is viewed not as a matter of right, but of 
being worthy of belonging to the political commu-
nity. This was the rationale that had excluded Afri-
can Americans, Native Americans, Asians, Mexican 
Americans, women and the poor from the political 
process throughout American history.240 
According to Burgess, the colonies were not under the scope of 
such privilege.241 The Insular Cases reflect this sentiment firstly 
by supplying Congress with omnipotent plenary powers.242 Sec-
ondly, they define the relationship between the territories and the 
United States in such a way that reassures the inhabitants of the 
territories that they possess some measure of equality vis–à–vis the 
states of the Union, when in actuality they do not.243 However, as 
is plain from Justice White’s incorporation doctrine and Judge 
Poole’s use of the “impractical and anomalous” standard in Wabol, 
the federal judiciary has allowed Congress to remain the ultimate 
arbiter of constitutional guarantees in unincorporated territories.244 
Considering the racist attitudes backing the legislation pertain-
ing to the governance of Puerto Rico since 1900, even “fundamen-
tal” constitutional rights are precariously situated when the federal 
government claims its power to act under the Insular Cases doc-
trine.245 Even though the Downes judgment offers some semblance 
of constitutional guarantee,246 the incorporation doctrine and the 
“impractical and anomalous” standard have been used to circum-
vent even one of the most fundamental constitutional protections in 
the territories: equal protection of the laws.247 
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 242 Torruella, supra note 29, at 73. 
 243 See Cabranes, supra note 86, at 397–98. 
 244 Herald, supra note 45, at 712, 719. 
 245 See id. at 712. 
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The Insular Cases were a clear abandonment of the Supreme 
Court’s abhorrence of colonial governance, and they justified the 
dominion over the new territories by highlighting their geograph-
ical distance, non–American communities, and differing races, 
languages, cultures, religious and legal systems.248 Even after the 
grant of citizenship to all Puerto Rican residents in 1917, the Insu-
lar Cases doctrine cemented the notion of “otherness” that under-
girded the decisions on how to govern the 1898 territories.249 
Judge Torruella expresses the concern that John W. Burgess’ views 
of political voice as privilege rather than right have become a reali-
ty: 
What we have in this relationship is not the subor-
dination of Puerto Rico’s political power to that of 
the United States, but rather the lack of any political 
power by Puerto Rico vis–à–vis the United States. 
The United States citizens residing in Puerto Rico 
do not have the right to vote for national offices. 
Even more importantly, they lack any voting repre-
sentation in Congress, the body that has plenary 
power over Puerto Rico and its citizens, and whose 
enactments permeate every facet of Puerto Rican 
society. Supreme legislative power therefore lies 
solely in an institution that enacts laws without any 
effective participation or consent from the U.S. citi-
zens who are obligated to comply with them.250 
What Judge Torruella describes is essentially government 
without consent of the governed251 and total disregard for the En-
lightenment principles that led to the creation of the United States 
                                                                                                             
 248 Torruella, supra note 29, at 62–63. 
 249 Rivera Ramos, supra note 31, at 291 (“The ‘other’ is always inferior, less 
capable, predestined, of course, to be governed, to be held in tutelage . . . or 
‘protected,’ to be brought within the ideological world of the dominating power, 
but sufficiently at a distance so as not to confuse the respective communities 
they inhabit; in short, to be kept at the same time ‘within and without’ the Con-
stitution.”). 
 250 Torruella, supra note 29, at 82. 
 251 Id. 
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in the first place.252 Furthermore, as Professor Rivera Ramos pos-
tulates, the notion of “otherness” facilitated the current colonial 
relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico.253 He de-
scribes the principle of the inequality of peoples as the grounds for 
expanding the American Empire in the Caribbean Sea and the Pa-
cific Ocean: 
The categories [of peoples] were constructed in di-
rect reference to race: the white, Anglo–Saxon race 
was the privileged pole in the discourse of power; 
the “others,” the non–white and the non–Europeans, 
those of mixed races, were to be in the receiving 
end of the exercise of that power. Those “others” 
were the barbarous, the stagnant, the irrational, the 
indolent, the disorderly and the undeserving more 
fit to be governed than to govern. Whereas the tem-
perate zones were thought to be more conducive to 
hard work . . . and [] capacity for self–government 
and economic and scientific progress, the “tropics” 
were considered to be breeders of lazy, ignorant, 
and inferior populations incapable of self–
government and condemned to be governed from 
outside in order to progress and civilization ever to 
flourish in their midst.254 
The “barbaric races,” as John W. Burgess would describe 
them,255 were undeserving of self–government and incorporation 
into the American polity by the full extension of privileges accom-
panying American citizenship.256 
                                                                                                             
 252 See Rivera Ramos, supra note 31, at 288 (“Just as the American Revolu-
tion and the founding of the nation had been permeated by the early rhetoric of 
the Enlightenment – with its emphasis on a particular conception of freedom, 
reason, and progress – so the new phase of imperial republicanism . . . was to 
incorporate the consummate discourse of latter day Enlightenment culture: a true 
‘imperial culture . . . whose forward march of power and knowledge, of rational-
ity and control led spatially across the globe while penetrating internally with 
new modes of regimentation.”). 
 253 See id. at 284–85. 
 254 Id. at 286. 
 255 Id. at 287. 
 256 See id. at 285–86. 
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The combination of these Social Darwinist views and the ne-
cessity created by the new challenges that the federal government 
faced when the United States suddenly acquired the heavily popu-
lated and “exotic” territories demanded the creation of a new colo-
nial policy, but the Constitution was a challenge to effective gov-
ernance.257 Drawing from the overtly racist discussion of the day, 
including the corollary concepts of “otherness” and Social Darwin-
ism,258 the Insular Cases regimented American colonial policy into 
its legal interpretation, allowing Congress to subordinate the unin-
corporated territories and deprive them of any constitutional guar-
antee, except those that Congress allows.259 
IV. UNITED STATES V. VAELLO-MADERO 
A. The Facts 
The Appellee, José Luis Vaello–Madero was born in Puerto 
Rico in 1954.260 Like all others born in Puerto Rico after 1917, he 
is a United States citizen as a result of the Jones–Shafroth Act and 
later legislation “granting birthright citizenship to Puerto Rico’s 
native–born inhabitants.”261 The Appellee lived in New York from 
1985 until 2013.262 While still residing in New York, the Appellee 
“was afflicted with severe health problems” that required him 
seeking aid under the SSI program.263 In 2012, he was eligible to 
receive SSI benefits and began receiving such payments to a 
checking account in New York.264 
However, in 2013, Appellee moved to Loíza, Puerto Rico, and 
did not face any issues with SSI payments connected to his reloca-
tion until June 2016.265 Upon applying for Title II Social Security 
Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits, as distinguished from Title 
XVI Supplemental Security Income (SSI), the Social Security 
                                                                                                             
 257 See id. at 287–91. 
 258 See Rivera Ramos, supra note 31, at 289–90. 
 259 Id. at 298, 300. 
 260 United States v. Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 2020). 
 261 Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1402 (2020). 
 262 Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 15. 
 263 Id. 
 264 Id. 
 265 Id. 
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Administration notified him “that it was discontinuing his SSI ben-
efits retroactively to August 1, 2014 because he was, and had been 
since that date, ‘outside of the U.S. for 30 days in a row or 
more.’”266 According to the Code of Federal Regulations, the So-
cial Security Administration does not consider Puerto Rico to be a 
part of the United States in “the geographical sense.”267 Further-
more, the Social Security Administration will not make SSI pay-
ments to individuals that are not present in one of the states, the 
District of Columbia, and the Northern Mariana Islands268 for more 
than thirty days269 because the beneficiary must be a resident of the 
United States.270 
A year after discontinuing the Appellee’s SSI payments, the 
federal government filed a suit against him in federal court for the 
District of Puerto Rico, seeking to collect $28,081.271 The damages 
claimed were the amount owed to the Social Security Administra-
tion by the Appellee due to the “improper payment of SSI bene-
fits” after he left New York for Puerto Rico.272 
B. The District Court’s Decision 
The Appellee raised an equal protection defense, arguing that 
the exclusion from the SSI program of Puerto Rico residents, who 
are citizens of the United States, contravened the equal protection 
guarantees of the Fifth Amendment.273 Meanwhile, the federal 
government argued that Congress could exclude Puerto Rican resi-
dents from SSI benefits under its “authority to enact social and 
economic regulation.”274 After realizing that there were “no mate-
rial facts in contention” and that the resolution of the dispute de-
pended solely on whether exclusion of Puerto Ricans from the SSI 
                                                                                                             
 266 Id. at 15–16. 
 267 20 C.F.R. § 416.215 (2020); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1382c (2020). 
 268 Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 16; see also 48 U.S.C. § 1801; see also 20 
C.F.R. § 416.215. 
 269 Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 15–16. 
 270 Id. at 16; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1382c (2020) (“For purposes of this title, 
the term ‘aged, blind, or disabled individual’ means an individual who . . . is a 
resident of the United States . . . .”). 
 271 Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 16. 
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 274 United States v. Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d 208, 213 (D.P.R. 2019). 
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program violated the Fifth Amendment, both parties filed for 
summary judgment.275 
The District Court disagreed with the federal government’s ar-
gument that Congress “can disparately classify United States citi-
zens residing in Puerto Rico” because it would be “counter to the 
very essence and fundamental guarantees of the Constitution it-
self.”276 Relying on United States v. Windsor, the court states that 
the “liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause contains within it the prohibition against denying to any 
person the equal protection of the laws.”277 In Windsor, the Su-
preme Court reaffirmed that the constitutional guarantee of equali-
ty “‘must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to 
harm a politically unpopular group cannot justify disparate treat-
ment of that group.’”278 At the same time, according to the District 
Court, the Territorial Clause of Article IV of the Constitution did 
not supply the federal government with the ability to determine 
which rights apply in the Territories and in what circumstances, 
especially fundamental guarantees like the equal protection of the 
laws.279 Under Boumediene v. Bush, the court says: 
“Abstaining from questions involving formal sover-
eignty and territorial governance is one thing. To 
hold the political branches have the power to switch 
the Constitution on or off at will is quite another.” 
This “would permit a striking anomaly in our tripar-
tite system of government, leading to a regime in 
which Congress and the President . . . say what the 
law is.” The authority to treat the territory of Puerto 
Rico itself unlike the States does not stretch as far 
as to permit the abrogation of fundamental constitu-
tional protections to United States citizens as Con-
gress sees fit.280 
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The District Court, under these principles, found that Con-
gress’s legislative authority to enact economic and social legisla-
tion was insufficient justification for excluding Puerto Ricans, 
United States citizens, from SSI benefits.281 Judge Gelpí, for the 
District of Puerto Rico, stated: 
In light of Windsor, the discriminatory statute at bar 
fails to pass rational basis constitutional muster. 
United States citizens in Puerto Rico are deprived of 
receiving SSI benefits based solely on the fact that 
they live in a United States territory. Classifying a 
group of the Nation’s poor and medically neediest 
United States citizens as “second tier” simply be-
cause they reside in Puerto Rico is by no means ra-
tional. An overwhelming percentage of the United 
States citizens residing in Puerto Rico are of His-
panic origin and are regarded as such despite their 
birthright United States citizenship.282 
The District Court went on to find that the exclusion of Puerto 
Rican residents from SSI was a “deprivation of the liberty of the 
person,” guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment.283 Pursuing gov-
ernmental efficiency, an essential component of “line drawing” 
necessary for Congress to enact social and economic legislation, 
“is never a valid reason for disparate treatment of United States 
citizen’s fundamental rights.”284 
Furthermore, the arbitrariness of Congress’s decision to ex-
clude Puerto Rican residents from SSI benefits is shown by the 
inclusion of the Northern Mariana Islands in the program, and “ev-
idences that Congress, in fact, has recognized the importance of 
extending the program to United States citizens in the territo-
                                                                                                             
 281 Id. at 213. 
 282 Id. at 214. 
 283 Id. 
 284 Id. at 214–15 (Judge Gelpí highlights that the federal government argued 
that both (1) the high cost of including Puerto Rico in the SSI program and (2) 
the fact that Puerto Rico does not pay federal income taxes that fund the SSI 
program were sufficient grounds to exclude Puerto Rico) (emphasis added). 
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ries.”285 Importantly, the court found for the Appellee because 
equal protection guarantees are fundamental rights “of all United 
States citizens” and those rights should apply equally “in the States 
as in the Territories, without distinction.”286 Congress’s attempt to 
legislate “a citizenship apartheid based on historical and social 
ethnicity within United States soil” contravenes the fundamental 
guarantees of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution and 
creates “an impermissible second rate citizenship akin to that 
premised on race and amounts to Congress switching off the Con-
stitution.”287 Ultimately, the District Court found that Congress 
could use neither its authority to pass social and economic legisla-
tion nor the Territorial Clause of Article IV as “blank check[s]” to 
“dictate when and where the Constitution applies to its citizens,” 
even if these citizens are outside the nation’s borders.288 
C. On Appeal at the First Circuit 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s 
judgment and focused on Supreme Court precedent that the federal 
government used to justify its exclusion of Puerto Rican residents 
from SSI benefits.289 Under the Fifth Amendment’s equal protec-
tion component, a denial of due process results from discrimination 
by the federal government.290 For the equal protection standard, 
the First Circuit utilizes the rational basis test to determine the con-
                                                                                                             
 285 Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 215 n.8; see also United States v. 
Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d 12, 30 (1st Cir. 2020) (“[T]he fact that Congress ex-
tended SSI benefits to the residents of the Northern Mariana Islands as part of 
the Islands’ covenant to enter the United States undercuts the Appellant’s only 
offered explanations for the exclusion. Aside from where they live, the other-
wise SSI–qualifying residents of Puerto Rico and the Northern Mariana Islands 
have the legally–relevant characteristics in common, i.e., they are (1) low–
income and low–resourced, (2) elderly, disabled, or blind, and (3) generally 
exempted from paying federal income tax.”). 
 286 Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 215. 
 287 Id. 
 288 Id. (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 533 U.S. 723, 765 (2008) (“The Consti-
tution grants Congress and the President the power to acquire, dispose of, and 
govern territory, not the power to decide when and where its terms apply.”)). 
 289 Id. 
 290 Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 18 (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 
499 (1954)). 
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stitutionality of the challenged law.291 Under rational basis review, 
“a legislative classification” will be upheld if “the classification 
itself is rationally related to a legitimate government interest.”292 
Furthermore, the standard places the burden of proof on the party 
challenging the law to defeat “every conceivable basis which 
might support it.”293 Under the United States Code Title 42’s sec-
tion 1381, the challenged classification are those United States cit-
izens who are otherwise eligible for SSI benefits but for their resi-
dence in Puerto Rico.294 According to the First Circuit, such classi-
fication is “clearly irrelevant to the stated purpose of the program, 
which is to provide cash assistance to the nation’s financially 
needy elderly, disabled, or blind” and must be sustained by “some 
legitimate governmental interest [not] specifically stated in the 
[law].”295 
i. The First Circuit Indirectly Addresses the Relevance of the 
Insular Cases Through Its Treatment of Califano and Harris 
To fulfill the rational basis requirements, the federal govern-
ment argued that exclusion of Puerto Rican residents serves legiti-
mate governmental interests because of “the unique tax status of 
Puerto Rico and the costs of extending the program” to its resi-
dents.296 The federal government also proffered Califano v. Gau-
tier Torres, a Supreme Court decision from 1978, as a basis on 
which to exclude Puerto Rican residents from SSI.297 Califano had 
reversed a district court judgment holding that denial of SSI pay-
ments to “a recipient who acquired them while a resident of Con-
necticut, but was thereafter denied them by reason of his moving to 
Puerto Rico,” contravened his “constitutional right to travel.”298 
According to the First Circuit, the federal government regarded 
Califano as valuable precedent because it involved a statutory pro-
                                                                                                             
 291 Id. 
 292 Id. (citing Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno 413 U.S. 533 (1973)). 
 293 Id. (citing FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993)). 
 294 Id. 
 295 Id. at 18–19. 
 296 Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 19. 
 297 Id.; see generally Califano v. Gautier Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978). 
 298 Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 19. 
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vision establishing government benefits and is thus entitled to “a 
strong presumption of constitutionality.” 299 
The federal government also relied on Harris v. Rosario, in 
which the Supreme Court held that Congress derived sufficient 
authority from the Territorial Clause to “treat Puerto Rico differ-
ently from States so long as there is a rational basis for its ac-
tions.”300 According to the Supreme Court, three factors enunciat-
ed in Califano were enough to fulfill the rational basis test and up-
hold the exclusion of Puerto Rican residents from SSI: (1) Puerto 
Rican residents do not pay federal taxes, (2) the cost of extending 
SSI to the Island would be high, and (3) the increased benefits 
would “disrupt the Puerto Rican economy.”301 
The First Circuit underscores that, while still valid Supreme 
Court precedent, Califano and Harris dealt with the right to travel 
and with block grants for the Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children Program, respectively, not with the “validity of alleged 
discriminatory treatment . . . as required by the SSI program under 
the prism of equal protection.”302 As such, neither case was con-
trolling Supreme Court precedent precluding the Appellee’s claim 
that his exclusion from SSI contravened equal protection guaran-
tees.303 At the same time, despite Califano and Harris, the First 
Circuit maintains that the federal government must still have a ra-
tional justification to make suspect legislative classification, or else 
the rational basis test might become a “nullity” and “suspend the 
operation of the Equal Protection Clause in the field of social wel-
fare law . . . .”304 Thus, the First Circuit finds that equal protection 
principles survive Califano and Harris, and can be grounds to de-
                                                                                                             
 299 Id. (citing Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976)). 
 300 Id. at 20 (citing Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651–52 (1980)). 
 301 Id. (citing Califano, 435 U.S. at 5 n.7). 
 302 Id. at 21. 
 303 Id. (“Of relevance to Appellant’s contention that Califano and Harris 
control this appeal is an axiomatic legal tenet that must be factored into consid-
eration of our ultimate decision: that [t]he precedential effect of a summary [dis-
position] can extend no further than ‘the precise issues presented and necessarily 
decided by those actions.’”). 
 304 Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 21 (citing Baker v. City of Concord, 916 
F.2d 744, 749 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
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cide the Appellee’s claim in Vaello-Madero despite valid Supreme 
Court precedent.305 
ii. The Federal Government Fails the Rational Basis Test 
The First Circuit held that denying SSI benefits to the Appel-
lee, and Puerto Rican residents by extension, does not meet the 
standards of the rational basis test.306 The First Circuit found that 
excluding Puerto Rican residents merely for residing in a territory 
and not a state bore no “rational relation to a legitimate legislative 
goal.”307 Furthermore, the First Circuit found unpersuasive the 
federal government’s contention, stated previously in Califano, 
that “the unique tax status of Puerto Rico [by which] its residents 
do not contribute to the public treasury” because they do not pay 
federal taxes.308 Similarly, the court disagreed with the federal 
government’s contention that the cost of including Puerto Rican 
residents in the SSI program was sufficient to establish a rational 
basis to exclude them.309 
The First Circuit initially ascertains that not only does Puerto 
Rico make “substantial contributions to the federal treasury,” but 
“in fact have consistently made them in higher amounts than tax-
payers in at least six states, as well as the territory of the Northern 
Mariana Islands.”310 Additionally, the court also highlights that 
Puerto Rican residents do make federal income tax payments when 
they receive income from sources outside Puerto Rico (when fed-
                                                                                                             
 305 See id. at 17–23 (distinguishing Califano and Harris and arguing that 
equal protection principles survived these cases). 
 306 Id. at 23. 
 307 Id. 
 308 Id. at 24. 
 309 Id. at 27. 
 310 Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 24 (“From 1998 up until 2006, when Puerto 
Rico was hit by its present economic recession, Puerto Rico consistently con-
tributed more than $4 billion annually in federal taxes and impositions into the 
national fisc. This is more than taxpayers in several of the states contributed, 
including Vermont, Wyoming, South Dakota, North Dakota, Montana, and Ne-
braska, as well as the Northern Mariana Islands. Even since 2006 to the present, 
and notwithstanding monumental economic problems aggravated by cata-
strophic Hurricane María and serious ongoing earthquakes, Puerto Ricans con-
tinue to pay substantial sums into the federal treasury through the IRS: 
$3,443,334,000 in 2018; $3,393,432,000 in 2017; $3,479,709,000 in 
2016 . . . .”). 
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eral employees on the Island make regular payment of income tax-
es), as well as the full Social Security, Medicare, and Unemploy-
ment Compensation taxes that are paid elsewhere in the United 
States.311 As a result, according to the First Circuit, the justifica-
tion of excluding of Puerto Rican residents from SSI by arguing 
that the island’s residents do not contribute to the federal treasury 
is “no longer available.”312 Moreover, the First Circuit is not able 
to identify any other instance where the government has used the 
total absence of federal income tax payments as justification to 
exclude entire classes of people from welfare programs.313 
Next, the First Circuit determined that while Congress has am-
ple power to “create classifications that allocate noncontractual 
benefits under a social welfare program [and] protecting the fiscal 
integrity of Government programs,” considering cost alone is not 
sufficient justification for “differentiating individuals.”314 In the 
case at hand, the First Circuit explained that the deference usually 
afforded to “decisions based on fiscal considerations ‘that improve 
the protection afforded to the entire benefitted class’” is inapplica-
ble where “an entire segment of the would–be benefitted class is 
excluded.”315 According to the First Circuit, focusing only on the 
cost of extending SSI to cover Puerto Rican residents falls outside 
Congress’s authority to make decisions to “protect the fiscal integ-
rity” of similar welfare programs and the government itself be-
cause “the Fifth Amendment does not permit the arbitrary treat-
ment of individuals who would otherwise qualify for SSI” if not 
for their residence in Puerto Rico.316 Thus, according to the First 
Circuit, considering only the cost of including Puerto Rico’s disa-
bled, elderly, and blind in the federally–funded SSI program does 
not fulfill the rational basis test.317 
                                                                                                             
 311 Id. at 25. 
 312 Id. 
 313 Id. at 26 (quoting Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 63 (1982) (“Appel-
lants’ reasoning would permit the State to apportion all benefits and services 
according to the past tax . . . contributions of its citizens. The Equal Protection 
Clause prohibits such an apportionment of state services.”) (emphasis added)). 
 314 Id. at 28–29. 
 315 Id. at 29. 
 316 Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 30. 
 317 Id. 
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Importantly, the First Circuit disarms the federal government’s 
final argument that there is “no ‘equal footing doctrine’” between 
the territories that requires the peoples of one territory being treat-
ed the same as those of another.318 The federal government cited 
Palmore v. United States for the idea that “Congress may legislate 
differently for the territories than for the states, and differently for 
one territory than for another.”319 The First Circuit found this use 
of Palmore “inapt” because the case did not opine concretely on 
“Congress’s disparate treatment of territorial residents” and fo-
cused only on the question on what court could try and convict 
Palmore.320 As a result, the court “decline[s] to read Palmore’s 
holding so broadly as to permit Congress to sidestep the Fifth 
Amendment when it legislates for a territory.”321 Hence, the First 
Circuit holds, the federal government has no authority supporting 
the notion that “the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guaran-
tees should likewise stand aside in this case.”322 Thus, the federal 
government was not allowed to arbitrarily deny SSI benefits to the 
residents of Puerto Rico because of the equal protection doctrine of 
the Fifth Amendment.323 
V. ANALYSIS 
The Equal Protection Clause mandates that “all persons simi-
larly circumstanced shall be treated alike.”324 The District Court 
for the District of Puerto Rico and the Circuit Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit move squarely in the direction of making the 
above statement a reality for the residents of Puerto Rico.325 The 
                                                                                                             
 318 See id. at 31. 
 319 Id. 
 320 Id. 
 321 Id. 
 322 Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 31. 
 323 Id. 
 324 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (citing F.S. Royster Guano Co. 
v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 415 (1920)). 
 325 See, e.g., Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 23 (“Congress may not invidiously 
discriminate among such claimants on the basis of a ‘bare congressional desire 
to harm a politically unpopular group,’ or on the basis of criteria which bear no 
rational relation to a legitimate legislative goal.” (quoting Weinberger v. Salfi, 
422 U.S. 749, 772 (1975))). 
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Vaello-Madero decisions elevate the status of American citizens 
residing in Puerto Rico to that of American citizens residing in the 
fifty states.326 Referring to the federal government’s reliance on 
Article IV’s Territorial Clause, the District Court emphasized that 
“[t]his clause . . . is not carte blanche for Congress to switch on 
and off at its convenience the fundamental constitutional rights to 
Due Process and Equal Protection enjoyed by a birthright United 
States citizen who relocates from a State to Puerto Rico.”327 Judge 
Gelpí continues: “Congress, likewise, cannot demean and brand 
said United States citizen while in Puerto Rico with a stigma of 
inferior citizenship to that of his brethren nationwide.”328 The Dis-
trict Court and the First Circuit reaffirm that the principles of due 
process and equal protection apply in the territories as “sacrosanct 
fundamental constitutional protections afforded to United States 
citizens” in the same way they apply in the states of the Union.329 
A. Vaello-Madero Is Not the End of the Insular Cases 
In rejecting the federal government’s contention that the Terri-
torial Clause allows Congress to enact social welfare legislation for 
the territories and to determine the eligibility for such programs in 
any way, the District Court and the First Circuit have signaled that 
the federal judiciary will restrict the omnipotent plenary powers of 
Congress.330 However, Vaello-Madero is not a repudiation of the 
Insular Cases; nowhere does it grapple with the political relation-
ship between the United States and Puerto Rico.331 Nonetheless, 
                                                                                                             
 326 United States v. Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d 208, 214 (D.P.R. 2019) 
(“Classifying a group of the Nation’s poor and medically neediest United States 
citizens as ‘second tier’ simply because they reside in Puerto Rico is by no 
means rational.”). 
 327 Id. at 211. 
 328 Id. 
 329 Id. at 213; see also Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 31 (“So, for the reasons 
explained throughout this opinion, we hold that the Fifth Amendment forbids the 
arbitrary denial of SSI benefits to residents of Puerto Rico.”). 
 330 Vaello-Madero, 356 F.3d at 212–13 (stating that the Territorial Clause 
does not encompass unlimited power to legislate for the territories). 
 331 See, e.g., id. at 212 (“Today’s ruling will not delve into the complex con-
stitutional issues of Puerto Rico as a territory of the United States for the past 
120 years.”). The First Circuit’s affirmation is based on its interpretation of the 
federal government’s claims under Califano and Harris and not directly on the 
Insular Cases. See Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d at 21–22. 
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the decisions are a setback for the federal government’s ability to 
justify treating American citizens in nonincorporated territories as 
second–class citizens.332 In turn, this likely entails a stricter read-
ing of the Insular Cases, retracting from the federal government’s 
ability to legislate for the territories without adhering to fundamen-
tal constitutional guarantees.333 This aligns closer with Justice 
Brown’s pronouncements in the Downes opinion than to Justice 
White’s development of the incorporation doctrine in the plurality 
opinion of the same case.334 Curiously, however, in expounding 
the incorporation doctrine, it was Justice White himself who said: 
“[E]ven in cases where there is no direct command of the Constitu-
tion which applies, there may nevertheless be restrictions of so 
fundamental a nature that they cannot be transgressed, although not 
expressed in so many words in the Constitution.”335 Unfortunately, 
Justice White did not specify which rights he had in mind.336 
As has been demonstrated in the Ninth Circuit, federal courts 
are capable of taking advantage of such lack of specificity regard-
ing the application of constitutional guarantees in the territories.337 
Thus, as Professor Herald laments, the judiciary branch is able to 
stretch the Insular Cases doctrine to circumvent the application of 
                                                                                                             
 332 Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 214. 
 333 See id. at 210–11. 
 334 Compare Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 283 (“Whatever may be 
finally decided by the American people as to the status of these islands and their 
inhabitants . . . it does not follow that, in the meantime, awaiting that decision, 
the people are in the matter of personal rights unprotected by the provisions of 
our Constitution . . . .”), with Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 293 (“And the 
determination of what particular provision of the Constitution is applicable, 
generally speaking, in all cases, involves an inquiry into the situation of the 
territory and its relation to the United States.”) (White, J., concurring). 
 335 Downes, 182 U.S. 244, 291 (White, J., concurring). 
 336 Id. at 294–95 (“Undoubtedly, there are general prohibitions in the Consti-
tution in favor of the liberty and property of the citizen . . . which are an absolute 
denial of all authority under any circumstances or conditions to do particular 
acts.”) (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 337 See, e.g., Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1462 (1990) (Employing 
the “impractical and anomalous” standard to circumvent equal protection guar-
antees in the Northern Mariana Islands to “preserve and protect” the islands’ 
culture and land.). 
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“fundamental” constitutional guarantees.338 Concurring in 
Rassmussen v. United States, part of the Insular Cases, Justice 
Harlan, the elder, criticized such an approach by the Supreme 
Court and took a position analogous to the one in Vaello-Madero: 
The proposition that a people subject to the full au-
thority of the United States for purposes of govern-
ment, may, under any circumstances, or for any pe-
riod of time, long or short, be governed, as Con-
gress pleases to ordain, without regard to the Con-
stitution, is, in my judgment, inconsistent with the 
whole theory of our institutions. 
If the Constitution does not become the supreme 
law in a Territory acquired by treaty, and whose in-
habitants are under the dominion of the United 
States, until Congress . . . shall have expressed its 
will to that effect, it would necessarily follow 
that . . . Congress, under the theory of “incorpora-
tion” . . . could forever withhold from the inhabit-
ants of such Territory the benefit of all the guaran-
ties of life, liberty, and property as set forth in the 
Constitution. I cannot assent to any such doctrine. I 
cannot agree that the supremacy of the Constitution 
depends upon the will of Congress.339 
The elder Justice Harlan’s statement highlights the danger of 
the incorporation doctrine that has taken hold of the federal judici-
ary when dealing with the territories and has allowed the govern-
ment more freedom when legislating for unincorporated territo-
ries.340 
                                                                                                             
 338 Herald, supra note 45, at 712, 768; see also Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1463 
(concluding that congressionally–enacted provisions of a territorial constitution 
are not subject to challenge under equal protection guarantees). 
 339 Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 530 (1905) (Harlan, J., con-
curring). 
 340 See Rivera Ramos, supra note 31, at 254 (“‘There is a wide difference,’ 
[Justice Brown] argued, ‘between the full and paramount power of Congress in 
legislating for a territory in the condition of Porto Rico and its power with re-
spect to the States . . . .’” (citing Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151, 155 
(1901))). 
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Despite his grandfather’s position in Rassmussen, Justice Har-
lan created the “impractical and anomalous” standard, derived 
from the Insular Cases,341 and used in Wabol to justify circum-
venting equal protection guarantees.342 It is precisely against this 
trend of doctrinal overexpansion that Vaello-Madero militates, 
even though neither the District Court nor the First Circuit relied 
directly on the Insular Cases.343 Furthermore, it is sadly ironic that 
federal courts in the 21st century should be struggling with prece-
dent to revert the judiciary branch to Justice Brown’s opinion in 
Downes, when a plurality agreed that fundamental constitutional 
guarantees should apply to the territories.344 According to the rea-
sonings in Vaello-Madero, the Constitution and the Insular Cases 
do not give Congress the ability to cherry–pick which fundamental 
protections apply to the territories.345 Hence, like in Downes and 
Flores de Otero,346 Vaello-Madero affirms that the Constitution’s 
equal protection and due process guarantees constrain the federal 
government’s use of its broad territorial powers conferred to it by 
the Territorial Clause.347 
Nonetheless, Vaello-Madero is not by any means a death blow 
to the Insular Cases, but merely reaffirms that fundamental consti-
tutional guarantees should apply in unincorporated territories.348 
As a result, Vaello-Madero is only a return to the beginning of the 
Insular Cases doctrine.349 
                                                                                                             
 341 Merriam, supra note 230, at 181. 
 342 Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1462. 
 343 See generally United States v. Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d 208, 210–
11 (D.P.R. 2019) (denying that the Territorial Clause is a blank check for Con-
gress to pick and choose which constitutional provisions apply in the territories 
in any given time, which is opposed to the Insular Cases and their progeny). 
 344 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 268 (1901) (citing Mormon Church v. 
United States, 136 U.S. 1, 10 (1890)). 
 345 See, e.g., Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 213. 
 346 Examining Bd. of Eng’rs v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 600 (1976); 
see Downes, 182 U.S. at 282–83. 
 347 See United States v. Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d 12, 17–18 (1st Cir. 2020); 
see also Vaello Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 210–11. 
 348 Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 213 (“The authority to treat the terri-
tory of Puerto Rico itself unlike the States does not stretch as far as to permit the 
abrogation of fundamental constitutional protections to United States citizens as 
Congress sees fit.”). 
 349 Downes, 182 U.S. at 282–83. 
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i. Vaello-Madero Promotes the Development of Democratic 
Relationships between the United States and the People of the 
Unincorporated Territories 
Vaello-Madero is plainly contrasted with the Ninth Circuit’s 
dangerous extension of the Insular Cases doctrine in Wabol in 
holding that the “impractical and anomalous standard” allowed the 
federal government to circumvent equal protection guarantees in 
the Northern Mariana Islands.350 One is well served by remember-
ing Judge Pool’s distinction between the fundamental rights that 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guaran-
tees to the states versus the fundamental rights incorporated into 
the Territory Clause to be applied in the unincorporated territo-
ries.351 The Ninth Circuit’s understanding of Territorial Clause 
authority and the Insular Cases is much more expansive than the 
First Circuit’s.352 
Vaello-Madero promotes what future Justice Felix Frankfurter 
termed in 1914 “inventive statesmanship” because it reinterprets 
authority under the Territorial Clause and the Insular Cases to en-
courage a more democratic relationship between the United States 
and its territories.353 According to Hernández Colón, inventive 
                                                                                                             
 350 Compare Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 213 (“[T]he broad power 
granted under the Territorial Clause does not allow Congress to eradicate the 
sacrosanct fundamental constitutional protections afforded to United States 
citizens residing in the States and Puerto Rico.”) (emphasis added), and Vaello-
Madero, 956 F.3d at 23 (applying the rational basis test because equal protection 
guarantees attach to United States citizens residing in Puerto Rico), with Wabol 
v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1462 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying the “impractical 
and anomalous” standard to circumvent equal protection guarantees). 
 351 Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1460. 
 352 See id. (“This court rejected the broad proposition that those guarantees 
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment for application to the states must 
also be incorporated into the territory clause for application to the Common-
wealth. What is fundamental for purposes of Fourteenth Amendment incorpora-
tion is that which ‘is necessary to an Anglo–American regime of ordered liber-
ty.’ In contrast, ‘fundamental’ within the territory clause are “‘those . . . limita-
tions in favor of personal rights’ which are ‘the basis of all free government.’”) 
(citations omitted). 
 353 See Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 213 (“The powers granted under 
the Constitution are not infinite. ‘The power the Constitution grants it also re-
strains. And though Congress has great authority to design laws to fit its own 
conception of sound national policy, it cannot deny the liberty protected by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.’”) (citing United States v. Wind-
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statesmanship is required “to establish truly democratic arrange-
ments and allocations of powers protected by the U.S. Constitu-
tion, based on the principle of consent by the governed.”354 Vaello-
Madero’s defense of fundamental constitutional guarantees pur-
sues inventive statesmanship by respecting Puerto Rico’s right to 
self–determination and the principle of government by consent, as 
recognized in the compact created under Public Law 600 in 
1950.355 As one commentator has noted, “[O]nce a society, such as 
[Puerto Rico], freely chooses to become a “part” of the United 
States, and its inhabitants freely choose to become citizens of the 
United States, then the application of the Constitution should not 
be subject to negotiation.”356 
Vaello-Madero’s refusal to compromise in the application of 
equal protection guarantees in the territories, as the federal gov-
ernment urged, pursues the principles of individual liberty and true 
government by consent.357 Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg as-
serted a similar principle in their dissent in Schuette v. Coalition to 
Defend Affirmative Action: 
                                                                                                             
sor, 570 U.S. 744, 774 (2013)); see also Hernández Colón, supra note 109, at 
603 (“[Cases like Flores de Otero] . . . supplied Congress with creative judicial 
platforms within the Territorial Clause on which to structure democratic rela-
tionships with citizens of the United States residing in nonstate areas. Respect 
for the integrity of these judicial platforms ensures that these relationships—
conceived in liberty and by the consent of the governed—protect the rights of 
Puerto Ricans as American citizens.”). 
 354 See Hernández Colón, supra note 109, at 589, 593. 
 355 Id. at 593; see also Public Law 600 ch. 446, 64 Stat. 319, 319 (1950). 
 356 Herald, supra note 45, at 756 (citing James A. Branch, Jr., The Constitu-
tion of the Northern Mariana Islands: Does a Different Cultural Setting Justify 
Different Constitutional Standards?, 9 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 35, 38–39 
(1980)). 
 357 Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 213 (“‘The liberty protected by the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause contains within it the prohibition 
against denying to any person the equal protection of the laws.”‘); see also 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 672 (2015) (“The Due Process Clause and 
the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way, though they set 
forth independent principles. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by 
equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always coextensive, 
yet, in some instances each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of 
the other.”). 
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We are fortunate to live in a democratic society. But 
without checks, democratically approved legislation 
can oppress minority groups. For that reason, our 
constitution places limits on what a majority of the 
people may do. Although [the guarantee of equal 
protection of the laws] is traditionally understood to 
prohibit intentional discrimination under existing 
laws, equal protection does not end there. Another 
fundamental strand of our equal protection jurispru-
dence focuses on process, securing to all citizens 
the right to participate meaningfully and equally in 
self–government. That right is the bedrock of our 
democracy, for it preserves all other rights.358 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court must address the validity of 
the Insular Cases in the 21st century if it wants to pursue the ideals 
of Vaello-Madero and elevate American citizens in the territories 
to the status of American citizens in the states.359 If not, federal 
courts are likely to continue pursuing an early 20th century agenda 
of distinguishing between citizens within the nation’s borders and 
those without.360 However, it is difficult to see how the Supreme 
Court could sharply redefine the Insular Cases doctrine precisely 
because of the amorphous nature that has facilitated its progressive 
expansion to the point where some federal courts are prepared to 
hold that the federal government is not always bound by funda-
mental guarantees.361 
                                                                                                             
 358 Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 337 
(2014) (Sotomayor & Ginsburg, J.J., dissenting). 
 359 See Hernández Colón, supra note 109, at 604. 
 360 Id. at 593. 
 361 See generally Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1992), for an 
example of how the Insular Cases doctrine and its progeny, like the “impractical 
and anomalous” standard, have been used to justify not applying the most basic 
constitutional protections in the territories; see generally Merriam, supra note 
230, for an explanation of the vague and manipulable nature of the legal princi-
ples derived from the Insular Cases. 
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B. It Is Unreasonable to Expect that the Supreme Court Will 
Use Vaello-Madero to Overrule the Insular Cases 
The major shortcoming of Vaello-Madero is that neither of the 
decisions refers explicitly to the Insular Cases when rejecting the 
federal government’s contentions.362 Instead, Vaello-Madero ap-
proaches the Insular Cases implicitly by how it handles the federal 
government’s reliance on Califano and Harris.363 Additionally, the 
First Circuit does not speak to the validity of Califano and Harris; 
instead, it opts to say that those cases are not controlling for Vael-
lo-Madero364 despite knowing that Califano and Harris rely on the 
Insular Cases doctrine for their reasoning.365 For instance, in foot-
note four of Califano, the Supreme Court appeared to accept the 
District Court for the District of Puerto Rico’s acknowledgment 
that “Congress has the power to treat Puerto Rico differently, and 
that every federal program does not have to be extended to it.”366 
In the same note, the Supreme Court remarked that “Puerto Rico 
has a relationship to the United States ‘that has no parallel in our 
history,’” and cited the Insular Cases for this proposition.367 As a 
result, at the Supreme Court, Vaello-Madero has a reduced poten-
tial to redefine the Insular Cases, particularly because the doctrine 
from these cases is not a foundational element of the District 
Court’s or the First Circuit’s reasoning. This problem is further 
compounded by the Supreme Court’s reticence in recent cases to 
                                                                                                             
 362 See Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 212 (“Today’s ruling will not 
delve into the complex constitutional issues of Puerto Rico as a territory of the 
United States for the past 120 years.”). 
 363 United States v. Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 2020) (high-
lighting that the ratio decidendi of Califano and Harris might be outdated). 
 364 Id. at 21 (“We are of the view that Califano was not decided on equal 
protection grounds, and that Harris did not involve a challenge to SSI direct aid 
to persons, and thus, neither case forecloses Appellee’s present contention that 
his wholesale exclusion from SSI violates the equal protection guarantee. We do 
not view Califano and Harris as a carte blanche for all federal direct assistance 
programs to discriminate against Puerto Rico residents.”). 
 365 See Brief for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Respondent at 3, United States v. Vaello-Madero, No. 20–303 (Sup. Ct. 
Nov. 9, 2020). 
 366 Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 3 n.4 (1978). 
 367 Id. 
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address the validity of the Insular Cases, even when encouraged to 
do so by multiple parties and amici.368 
In Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto Rico 
v. Aurelius Investment, LLC, the Insular Cases were explicitly 
brought to the Supreme Court’s attention after parties defending 
the Board’s existence argued that the Appointments Clause of Ar-
ticle II did not apply to Puerto Rico because of the Insular Cases 
doctrine.369 Jessica Méndez–Colberg, counsel for one of the parties 
in Aurelius, argued that “Equal [J]ustice [U]nder [L]aw,” the 
words at the entrance to the Court’s building, represented a princi-
ple “stretch[ed] . . . into its breaking point” under the Insular Cas-
es.370 “The court–made doctrine of territorial incorporation,” she 
continued, “means that when my client, and even myself, return to 
Puerto Rico, we will have a lesser set of constitutional rights than 
what we have standing here today.”371 Ms. Méndez–Colberg raised 
the issue of the Insular Cases doctrine at multiple points during her 
oral argument and despite arguing that the opposing party relied on 
the incorporation doctrine in defense of the Board’s existence,372 
the Justices appeared to ignore her pleas.373 Notwithstanding the 
impassioned criticism of the Insular Cases at oral argument, the 
Supreme Court in Aurelius declined to address their validity in its 
reasoning for upholding the appointment of Board members.374 
Vaello-Madero did not make the Insular Cases doctrine a cen-
tral aspect of its rationales, perhaps because the courts wished to 
avoid addressing its complexity and to reserve judgment for the 
Supreme Court.375 However, the Supreme Court has yet to address 
                                                                                                             
 368 See Cepeda Derieux & Weare, supra note 40, at 286. 
 369 Id. at 285. 
 370 Transcript of Oral Argument at 81, Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. 
v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649 (2020) (No. 18–1334) [hereinafter Tran-
script of Oral Argument]; see also Cepeda Derieux & Weare, supra note 40, at 
285. 
 371 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 370, at 81. 
 372 Id. at 85–87. 
 373 See id. 
 374 Cepeda Derieux & Weare, supra note 40, at 286. 
 375 United States v. Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 2020) (“The 
Supreme Court has not been equivocal in its dictates on this subject, stating that 
the decisions of that Court ‘remain binding precedent until [the Court] see[s] fit 
to reconsider them . . . .’”) (citing Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 252–53 
(1998)). 
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the Insular Cases, even in situations where it is clearly asked to do 
so.376 This suggests that it is unreasonable to expect that the Court 
will do the same if it decides to hear the federal government’s ap-
peal. Hence, the Insular Cases, the incorporation doctrine they 
spawned, and cases relying on such doctrine, like Wabol, remain 
viable for other courts and the Supreme Court.377 While this re-
mains the case, any constitutional rights that Puerto Rican residents 
currently enjoy are subject to further manipulation by the federal 
government and the judiciary.378 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Vaello-Madero should not be viewed as the federal judiciary’s 
repudiation of the Insular Cases. Firstly, it only encompasses one 
case while the Insular Cases doctrine was built throughout decades 
and in at least six cases.379 It is improbable that, in one fell swoop, 
the Supreme Court will discredit such an enormous amount of 
precedent because of one case. If the Insular Cases will eventually 
cease to be good law, they will likely take decades to dismantle, 
even if the Supreme Court ideologically agrees with the premise of 
treating American citizens of the unincorporated territories in the 
same way as citizens of the States.380 
                                                                                                             
 376 See Cepeda Derieux & Weare, supra note 40, at 286. 
 377 See id. (“Nonetheless, the Court’s clear mistrust of the Insular Cases, 
even as it declined to overrule them, continues a trend wherein the Court says 
one thing but then permits lower courts to do another. Since at least the 1950s, 
the Court has expressed skepticism of its territorial incorporation doctrine and 
has said courts should not extend it further. And yet, because they remain on the 
books, lower courts continue to rely on the Insular Cases to deprive residents of 
U.S. territories of rights and constitutional safeguards they almost surely en-
joy.”). 
 378 See Herald, supra note 45, at 713. 
 379 Doug Mack, The Strange Case of Puerto Rico, SLATE (Oct. 9, 2017), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/10/the-insular-cases-the-racist-
supreme-court-decisions-that-cemented-puerto-ricos-second-class-status.html. 
 380 See Neil Weare, Why the Insular Cases Must Become the Next Plessy, 
HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Mar. 28, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/why-
the-insular-cases-must-become-the-next-plessy/ (“It is long–past time that the 
Insular Cases be placed in the dustbin of history . . . .But to get there, we must 
rally the same kind of energy and resources that led to the Supreme Court’s 
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Secondly, Vaello-Madero does not altogether break from the 
Insular Cases doctrine. The Insular Cases stand for the proposition 
that Congress holds omnipotent plenary powers that allow the fed-
eral government “to rule over the islands without their consent or 
their democratic participation.”381 The incorporation doctrine, de-
rived from Justice White’s concurrence in Downes, holds that the 
applicability of fundamental constitutional restrictions on the gov-
ernment’s authority to legislate for the territories depends on 
whether the territory in question is incorporated (i.e., set on a path 
for statehood) or unincorporated.382 Vaello-Madero does not fight 
against the tenets of the Insular Cases, but it objects the subse-
quent expansion of their doctrine and seeks to reaffirm the original 
pronouncement by Justice Brown that “Congress, in legislating for 
the territories would be subject to those fundamental limitations in 
favor of personal rights which are formulated in the Constitution 
and its amendments; but these limitations would exist rather by 
inference and the general spirit of the Constitution . . . .”383 
Judge Gelpí, for the District of Puerto Rico, echoed this princi-
ple in the District Court’s opinion: “It is the Government’s role to 
protect the fundamental rights of all United States citizens. Fun-
damental rights are the same in the States as in the Territories, 
without distinction.”384 Vaello-Madero does not aim to redefine the 
omnipotent plenary powers Congress possesses to legislate for the 
territories, as is evidenced by the total lack of any reference to the 
Insular Cases in the opinions of the District Court and the First 
Circuit.385 Instead, Vaello-Madero only aims to ensure that Ameri-
can citizens in the unincorporated territories are treated equally, in 
recognition of the Supreme Court’s original intention in 
Downes.386 
                                                                                                             
historic decision in Brown. As history shows, change does not just happen on its 
own.”). 
 381 Torruella, supra note 29, at 73. 
 382 See Rivera Ramos, supra note 31, at 247–48. 
 383 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 268 (1901) (emphasis added). 
 384 United States v. Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d 208, 213 (D.P.R. 2019) 
(emphasis added). 
 385 Id. at 212 (“Congress indeed possesses a wide latitude of powers to effec-
tively govern its territories.”). 
 386 Id. at 210–11. 
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As such, Vaello-Madero militates against the concept of “oth-
erness” inherent in much of the Insular Cases doctrine, whereby 
notions of racial superiority, Manifest Destiny, and Social Darwin-
ism were constituted into the American “ideology of expan-
sion.”387 According to Professor Rivera Ramos, the idea that the 
peoples of the territories acquired in 1898 “were not fit to become 
full–fledged members of the American polity” and their incapacity 
for self–government are ingrained in the Insular Cases.388 Vaello-
Madero rejects these ideas and considers the American residents of 
Puerto Rico equal to those of the states.389 Paradoxically, Vaello-
Madero promises to modernize the Insular Cases doctrine by re-
turning to the original pronouncements of the Insular Cases them-
selves.390 The modernizing intent of Vaello-Madero is evident in 
the First Circuit’s treatment of Califano and Harris, where the 
court recognizes that the jurisprudential impetus in the aftermath of 
Boumediene and Windsor requires a renewed analysis of the ap-
plicability of the arguments raised in the former cases justifying 
the unequal application of the laws to the unincorporated territo-
ries.391 
Nonetheless, it is still the federal government’s position that 
Congress possesses constitutional authority to single–out the 
American citizens residing in Puerto Rico, subject only to the per-
                                                                                                             
 387 See Rivera Ramos, supra note 31, at 288–89. 
 388 Id. at 290. 
 389 Vaello Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 211 (“To hold otherwise would run 
afoul of the sacrosanct principle embodied in the Declaration of Independence 
that ‘All Men are Created Equal.’”). 
 390 Compare Vaello-Madero, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 211 (“[The Territorial 
Clause], however, is not carte blanche for Congress to switch on and off at its 
convenience the fundamental constitutional rights to Due Process and Equal 
Protection . . . .”), with Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 282–83 (1901) 
(“[T]here may be a distinction between certain natural rights, enforced in the 
constitution by prohibitions against interference with them, and what may be 
termed artificial . . . rights, which are peculiar to our own system of jurispru-
dence. Of the former class are the rights . . . to personal liberty and individual 
property . . . to due process of law and to an equal protection of the laws . . . .”). 
 391 United States v. Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 2020) (“Alt-
hough we, of course, cannot and do not quibble with such forceful and binding 
mandates, we would be remiss in complying with our own duty were we to 
blindly accept the applicability of Califano and Harris without engaging in a 
scrupulous inquiry into their relevance, application, and precedential value.”). 
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missive rational basis standard of review.392 According to the fed-
eral government’s petition for a writ of certiorari, the Equal Protec-
tion Clause regards “‘persons and classes of persons’ rather than 
places, and that the government thus remains free to establish ‘one 
system for one portion of its territory and another system for an-
other portion.’”393 Moreover, the federal government maintains 
that equal protection principles do not mandate equal legal treat-
ment of the territories because these principles “‘relate[] to equali-
ty between persons, as such, rather than between areas.’”394 Per-
haps the most consequential portion of the federal government’s 
argument is its refusal to recognize that equal protection of the 
laws does not apply uniformly everywhere that the United States is 
sovereign.395 Their petition proceeds: “Some provisions of the 
Constitution do require geographic uniformity . . . but the Equal 
Protection Clause simply is not among them.”396 The govern-
ment’s adherence to Califano and Harris and to principles of stare 
decisis in its arguments reflects its intention to preserve the ex-
panded role of the Insular Cases doctrine, despite the First Cir-
cuit’s suggestions that these cases may be disconnected from the 
reality of the times.397 
Now that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to hear the 
federal government’s appeal of the First Circuit’s decision,398 
Vaello-Madero represents another opportunity for the Supreme 
Court to address the folly that is the Insular Cases doctrine in light 
of the progress achieved regarding racial attitudes and the ideals of 
the politico–socio–economic development of nations since the be-
ginning of the 20th century. While the Insular Cases and their 
progeny continue to be accepted, “basic principles of federalism, 
government by consent, equal protection of the laws, and the guar-
antees of a republican form of government” are subjugated to co-
                                                                                                             
 392 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 36, at 10. 
 393 Id. (citing Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 30–31 (1880)). 
 394 Id. (first citing Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 98 (1914); then 
citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 427 (1961)). 
 395 Id. at 10–11 
 396 Id. (citations omitted). 
 397 See id. at 12–20. 
 398 Supreme Court to Weigh Puerto Rico Access to U.S. Aid, AP NEWS (Mar. 
1, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/supreme-court-puerto-rico-ssi-benefits-b0b
96a610a1b9f9e68f2283029c2aade. 
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lonial prerogatives, expediency and convenience, and to the pre-
sumed plenary powers of Congress in the territorial context.399 As 
others have observed, the Insular Cases and the federal govern-
ment’s ability to enforce disparate treatment of citizens are “obso-
lete vestige[s] of a racist, imperialist era of our Country which 
serves no purpose other than to differentiate between continental 
and non–continental American citizens.”400 If this “dark cloud”401 
of jurisprudence remains on the books, the courts and the federal 
government will continue to use the doctrine to deprive American 
citizens of their constitutional rights. 
                                                                                                             
 399 Terrasa, supra note 176, at 92. 
 400 Id.; see, e.g., Torruella, supra note 29, at 94 (“The Constitution does not 
authorize the United States to hold territory or its citizens in such a condition; 
the Insular Cases . . . validated this colonial status in direct contravention of the 
words and values of the Constitution. These cases were wrongly decided ab 
initio.”). 
 401 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 370, at 82. 
